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Trademark Infringement, Trademark
Dilution, and the Decline in Sharing of
Famous Brand Names:
An Introduction and Empirical Study
ROBERT BRAUNEIS†
PAUL HEALD††
INTRODUCTION
Many famous brand names have historically been
shared among dozens or even hundreds of different
companies.1 Courts and commentators often cite wellknown
† Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. For
research assistance in preparation for the empirical study, I would like to thank
Brian Abramson and Nithyambika Gurukumar. For research assistance on the
empirical study itself, I would like to thank Bereket Banbore, Xin Jiang, Vivek
Ramachandran, Anirudh Rao, and Lu Xie. For assistance at the Library of
Congress, I would like to thank Marilyn K. Parr and Ellen B. Terrell. For
comments on previous drafts of this Article, I would like to thank Michael
Abramowicz, David Welkowitz, and the participants in the 2009 Intellectual
Property Scholars Conference at Cardozo Law School. And for generous research
support, I would like to thank Dean Frederick M. Lawrence of The George
Washington University Law School.
†† Allen Post Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Development,
University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank Ian Block, Maureen
Cahill, and Christopher Layton for research assistance, and Bob Bone, Lori
Ringhand, and Sara Stadler for comments on earlier drafts.
1. We do not intend the terms “share” and “sharing,” as we use them in this
Article, to imply that one user of a brand name has granted permission to
another, or that there is any agreement between multiple users of a brand name
about their concurrent use. We are aware that “share” sometimes connotes
permission or agreement, or even altruistic motivation, which is why, for
example, the use of the phrase “file sharing” to describe peertopeer Internet
distribution has been so contentious. We have not, however, found a better term
to refer to multiple concurrent uses of a single brand name, and students of
trademark law will recognize that the phrase “concurrent use” would be
confusing because it has gained a particular meaning in the Lanham Act in
connection with concurrent registrations. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1067(a)
(2006).
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examples of sharing like Delta Airlines and Delta Faucets,2
or United Airlines and United Van Lines,3 but the list of
companies sharing these brand names and many others is
much, much longer. Trademark infringement law has
traditionally accommodated brandname sharing through
doctrines that limit protection to closely related goods and
to actual trading areas.4 Modern developments in
infringement law, however, have challenged those
doctrines,5 and trademark dilution legislation is arguably
based on the theory that some brand names are harmed by,
and should be protected against, any sharing at all.6 While
some cheer this increased protection,7 others fear that it will
make brandname sharing more difficult, and will thereby
reduce the stock of brand names available to businesses.8
2. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Autovation Techs., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 2d
756, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
3. See, e.g., Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. Ill.
1996).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 1415.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 2026.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 2728.
7. See, e.g., RUDOLF CALLMANN, 3 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
TRADEMARKS 1643 (2d ed. 1950) (“Dilution is an infection, which, if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the . . . value of [a] mark.”); Shahar J. Dilbary,
Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,”
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 605 (2007); Joshua G. Jones, The “Inequities” of
Dilution: How the Judiciary May Use Principles of Equity to Frustrate the Intent
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 91 J. PAT. TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 200,
202 (2009) (“The judicial response to this sudden infusion of dilution into state
trademark jurisprudence was tepid at best.”); Tara D. Rose, The High Price of
Fame Deserves a Discount: A Call for Uniform Dilution Law in North America
for the Protection of WellKnown Trademarks, 14 SW. J.L. & TRADE IN AMS. 195,
197 (2007) (“Protection from trademark dilution is an important international
concern requiring uniform protection. Uniform protection will create an
incentive for manufacturers to produce quality products, resulting in accurate
reputations on which the public can depend.”).
8. See, e.g., Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark
Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1230 (2008) (“[O]verly strict protection
of mark familiarity through the law of trademark dilution can burden
competitors who signal product quality and reliability . . . .”); Jesse A.
Hofrichter, Tool of the Trademark: Brand Criticism and Free Speech Problems
with the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1923,
1926 (2007) (“[Dilution law] may prove ineffective in application, and . . . will
not adequately shield all protected speech from threats of litigation, resulting in
a ‘chilling effect’ on speech.”) (footnote omitted); Julie ZandoDennis, Not
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Despite the longrunning controversy, however, to our
knowledge, no one has attempted to construct a framework
for analyzing brandname sharing or to conduct empirical
studies to determine whether broader trademark protection
has actually affected rates of brandname sharing.
This article provides an introduction to the study of
brandname sharing, and presents results from an empirical
study of sharing rates among 131 famous brand names from
1940 through 2010, conducted through an examination of
business names in the white pages telephone directories of
Chicago, Philadelphia, and Manhattan. Perhaps the most
dramatic finding of the study is that independent uses of
the 131 brand names—that is, uses of those names by
businesses other than those that made the names famous—
have declined from 3,000 to 1,380 between 1960 and 2010, a
54% drop.9 The Article then assesses potential causes for
that decline. We evaluate five potential nonlegal factors,
including economic changes, family migration, decreased
attractiveness of particular famous brands, changes in the
popularity of business name types, and changes in cultural
naming patterns. We then consider evidence that changes
in trademark infringement and dilution law underlie some
part of the decline. The Article concludes that both legal and
nonlegal factors have likely played a role.
Part I of the Article reviews the history of brandname
sharing and the legal doctrines that address it. Part II
introduces the empirical study and explains its design.
Since this study is the first of its kind, we provide a detailed
justification for our methodology. Part III summarizes the
results of the study, including totals and breakdowns by
type of brand name, city, and year. Part IV considers
potential nonlegal causes of the decline in brandname
sharing rates. Part V assesses the argument that increased
trademark infringement protection, and the introduction of
dilution protection, were among the causes of the decline.
Part VI concludes that any evaluation of extant law or
proposal for future reform must account for the sharing
phenomenon we describe. The complete database generated
by the study, as well as all spreadsheets used to analyze the
Playing Around: The Chilling Power of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 599, 602 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court should
declare the FTDA unconstitutional . . . .”).
9. See infra text accompanying footnotes 10910.
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data, database documentation, and coding rules, are
available online.10
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO BRANDNAME SHARING AND ITS
LEGAL TREATMENT
Trademark lawyers may dream of a world in which each
separate source of goods or services is identified by a unique
brand name, but the sharing of brand names was
ubiquitous well before Congress ever passed a federal
trademark law. Numerous business proprietors who shared
a family name had affixed that name to their goods and
services, and thus in a single city like Philadelphia one can
find unrelated businesses operating under such names as
“Baker Chocolate and Cocoa,” “Baker Beauty Shop,” “Baker
Clothes,” “Baker Funeral Home,” and “Baker Pickling
Company.”11 Scores of others who lived in the same area had
affixed to their businesses the name of their city, their river,
their mountain, or their street. In the Chicago neighborhood
of Rogers Park, for example, businesses operate under such
names as the “Rogers Park Auto Body Shop,” “Rogers Park
Coiffures,” “Rogers Park Fine Wines and Spirits,” “Rogers
Park Insurance Group,” and “Rogers Park Locksmith.”12 Yet
others had adopted names that they hoped would convey
reliability, innovation, status, thrift, or other desirable
qualities. The “American Ever Ready Company” decided
that “Eveready” was a good brand name for its products—in
its case, flashlights and batteries—but it was joined by
many other companies: in the 1960 New York telephone
book alone, fourteen businesses bore that name, including
“Eveready Delivery Service Inc.,” “Eveready Match Co.,”
“Eveready Sewing Machine Co.,” and “Eveready Television
Service.”13
The judges and legislators who crafted trademark policy
had to recognize the reality that names such as “Baker,”
10. See Robert Brauneis & Paul Heald, TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT,
TRADEMARK DILUTION, AND THE DECLINE IN SHARING OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES:
AN INTRODUCTION AND EMPIRICAL STUDY, THE DATABASE AND THE SPREADSHEETS,
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/rbrauneis/brandnamesharing.htm (last visited
Nov. 18, 2010).
11. Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (database table Brand Name Uses).
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Rogers Park,” and “Eveready,” though shared, were still
serving as brand names, and could not be denied trademark
protection altogether. They therefore crafted a series of
doctrines that accommodated widespread sharing. The
doctrine that protection for a trademark extended only to its
area of geographical use enabled many local businesses
situated in different areas to share the same brand name.14
The doctrine that a trademark was only protected against
use on goods and services of the same type enabled even
those businesses whose geographical markets overlapped to
share the same brand name, so long as they specialized in
different fields of manufacture or trade.15
Although these doctrines were probably fashioned to
accommodate a preexisting reality rather than to promote
an ideal, in time brandname sharing was recognized to
have certain virtues. There is not an infinite stock of equally
memorable, mellifluous, evocative, and fashionable brand
names,16 and thus arrangements that allow many
businesses to share one brand name promote more efficient

14. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103 (1918);
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 422 (1916) (holding that the
first user of mark does not gain priority in remote area).
15. See Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 725 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 85, repealed by Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60
Stat. 444) (denying registration to marks that are identical or similar to
registered or known marks “appropriated to merchandise of the same
descriptive properties”); Consumers Petroleum Co. v. Consumers Co. of Ill., 169
F.2d 153, 161 (7th Cir. 1948) (applying the 1905 Act Rule). The doctrine that
trademark protection does not extend to descriptive marks without secondary
meaning also enabled widespread sharing, particularly as applied to personal
names. As Judge Richard Posner has acknowledged, that application does not
really fit the classic rationale for the doctrine. Instead, it stems from, among
other things, the recognition that consumers will not mistakenly believe that a
single source necessarily stands behind multiple uses of a personal name as a
brand name, since they understand that many personal names are shared by
many people. See Peaceable Planet, Inc. v. Ty, Inc., 362 F.3d 986, 988989 (7th
Cir. 2004).
16. Just one of many constraints is that meaningful words are easier to
remember than those that are not, and the stock of meaningful words is limited.
See Rabindra N. Kanungo, Brand Awareness: Effects of Fittingness,
Meaningfulness, and Product Utility, 52 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL., 290, 294 (1968);
Kim Robertson, Strategically Desirable Brand Name Characteristics, 1 J. PROD.
& BRAND MGMT. 62, 6465 (1992).
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and equitable use of a scarce resource.17 Indeed, the sharing
of a brand name may contribute to its memorableness, since
completely unfamiliar names may be more difficult to
remember.18 In addition, there may be some value in not
placing the meanings and associations connected with a
word under the dominant control of a single commercial
entity.19
In the second half of the twentieth century, however,
the practice of brandname sharing has faced increasing
challenges. First, under U.S. law, trademark rights are no
longer always limited to the geographic area of actual use.
Section 22 of the Lanham Act, passed in 1946, provided for
the first time that a registration on the Principal Register
17. The broader principle that good brand names are a scarce resource has
been recognized on many occasions throughout the history of U.S. trademark
law. For example, the elimination of the “token use” doctrine and the shortening
of the registration renewal period in the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988
were justified as measures to remove the amount of “deadwood” on the federal
register, a “serious problem” because “[u]nused marks on the trademark register
prevent others wishing to use those marks from doing so.” H.R. REP. NO. 100
1028, at 11 (1988). For academic recognition of this principle, see Stephen L.
Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 760 (1990):
The traditional economic justification for trademark law rests on the
premise that the set of available marks is virtually infinite and, in
consequence, that the actual mark chosen by a firm to represent its
goods is irrelevant. If that assumption turns out to be false—if even
before the public comes to associate a mark with any particular goods
or services, some marks are more desirable than others—then allowing
protection of marks devoid of market significance may raise substantial
barriers to entry by competitors.
Id.
18. Experiments have shown that in some contexts, a somewhat less common
name such as “Felix” is easier to remember than a more common name such as
“John.” See Nicola Stanhope & Gillian Cohen, Retrieval of Proper Names:
Testing the Models, 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 51, 64 (1993). However, we believe it
intuitively to be true that completely unfamiliar foreign names are more
difficult to remember upon first exposure. Readers whose only native language
is English can ask themselves whether they find it more difficult to remember
the name of a new acquaintance when it is say, a Chinese name like Xiaoguang
or Yangyue, a Hindu name like Anirudh or Sharmila, or a Thai name like
Adirake or Malivalaya.
19. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 30910
(9th Cir. 1992) (determining that putting the “New Kids” mark under the
complete control of the boy band would have deleterious economic
consequences).
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would provide constructive nationwide notice of the
registrant’s claim of ownership in a mark.20 Under that
provision, those who adopt a mark after its registration act
in bad faith as a matter of law and lose any priority battle
to the registrant.21 Therefore, the first user to register the
mark obtains the right to expand its use of the mark to
every region of the United States in which other users are
not already operating. The first registrant thus has the
power after expansion to limit others who were using the
mark before the registration date to their historical trading
area,22 and to prevent those who commenced use after the
date of registration from using the mark at all.23
At the same time, the Lanham Act extended these
advantages of registration to many marks that had
previously been excluded from registration under the
Trademark Act of 1905. Perhaps most significantly, the
1905 Act had excluded from registration marks that
consisted “merely in the name of an individual, firm,
corporation, or association . . . or merely in words . . . which
are descriptive of the goods with which they are used . . . or

20. Trademark Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79489, ch. 540, § 22, 60 Stat. 427,
435 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511129 (2006)). The Federal Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988 confirmed and strengthened the nationwide rights granted
by federal registration, by providing explicitly that “filing of the application to
register [a] mark shall constitute constructive use of the mark, conferring a
right of priority, nationwide in effect, on or in connection with the goods . . .
specified in the registration,” subject to a number of exceptions. Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3939 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1057(c) (2006)).
21. See, e.g., Action Temp. Servs., Inc. v. Labor Force, Inc., 870 F.2d 1563,
1566 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358,
362 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 472 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
22. See, e.g., Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.
1968).
23. At least as soon as a senior registered user wants to expand into the
geographic area of the junior user, it can obtain an injunction to force the junior
user to cease use of the mark, a threat that would likely lead many junior users
to change their brand names even before they were ordered to do so. See Dawn
Donut Co., 267 F.2d at 362. Moreover, more recent precedent has questioned
whether the senior registered user need demonstrate use in the same
geographical area before obtaining an injunction. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Carmax, Inc., 165 F.3d 1047 (6th Cir. 1999).
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merely a geographical name or term.”24 By contrast, the
Lanham Act allows inherently distinctive brand names to
be registered immediately, and personal names, descriptive
words, and geographical terms to be registered upon proof of
acquired distinctiveness, so long as they are not deceptive.25
In addition, as many commentators have detailed, the
scope
of
infringement
protection
has
increased
substantially, from protection only against goods and
services essentially identical to those with which the
plaintiff’s use is connected, to protection against goods and
services that are much more distantly related.26
This expanded scope of protection along both geographic
and subjectmatter dimensions may be traceable in part to
changes in judicial and legislative attitudes, including
attitudes about whether granting broad trademark
protection fosters monopolies. Yet changes in commercial
realities have also played a role in the expansion. For
example, because very small businesses can now offer goods
for sale nationwide and globally on the Internet, small no
longer necessarily means local. At the same time, as large
conglomerates have become more common, consumers have
become used to seeing a single corporate name in connection
with a wide variety of products. And although umbrella
branding of disparate goods has sometimes been an
incidental result of corporate growth, it has also
increasingly been the result of intentional branding
strategies. Companies that have decided to build a brand
around a lifestyle—“Virgin,” “Calvin Klein,” and “Harley
Davidson” come to mind—market a wide variety of goods
and services under a single brand name.

24. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724, 726 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 85, repealed by Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 444
(2006)).
25. See Trademark Act of 1946 § 2(f).
26. See, e.g., Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and
Infringement in Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 9941007 (2001)
(arguing that the likelihood of confusion standard broadened substantially by
the 1960s, rendering state dilution statutes redundant and obsolete); Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1839, 191314 (2007). The Lanham Act expressly provides protection
against confusion as to “association . . . sponsorship, or approval.” 15 U.S.C. §
1125(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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At least in theory, however, the most radical challenge
to brandname sharing has come from the passage of state
and federal trademark dilution statutes. Although the exact
rationale for protection against trademark dilution is much
debated,27 proponents of such protection contend that there
is value in concentrating all rights to use and control a
brand name in a single business, regardless of whether
other businesses would use that name on similar goods or
services, or whether multiple independent uses would be
likely to cause confusion among consumers.28 In 1947,
shortly after an attempt to include a federal antidilution
provision in the Lanham Act failed, states began to pass
antidilution statutes, and there are now thirtyeight states
that have such statutes.29 In 1995, Congress passed the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA”), which became
effective the following year.30 Unlike previous trademark
laws, these statutes contemplate that some brand names
will be protected against any sharing at all.
The state and federal antidilution laws, however,
clearly do not contemplate granting absolute protection
against sharing to all brand names. Rather, they offer extra
protection only to brand names which meet certain
standards. Chief among those is the requirement of fame:
the use of the brand name by the business seeking
protection must be wellknown.31 Since 2006, federal law
has required that a brand name be “widely recognized by
the general consuming public of the United States as a
designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s
owner.”32 Although federal law does not further specify what
“widely recognized” means, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy
has offered his opinion that “a minimum threshold survey
response should be in the range of 75% of the general
27. See, e.g., DAVID F. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE,
(2002).

AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 1314

28. See supra note 15.
29. Caroline Chicoine & Jennifer Visintine, The Role of State Trademark
Dilution Statutes in Light of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 96
TRADEMARK REP. 1155, 1155 (2006).
30. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 10498, 109
Stat. 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006)).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
32. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
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consuming public of the United States.”33 That is a very high
standard, which will be met by a very low percentage of
brandname users. Twentyfour of the thirtyeight state
antidilution laws currently in force, especially those
modeled after the 1992 and 1996 Model State Trademark
Bill, require that a brandname use be “famous in this
state.”34 That standard would seem to be best interpreted as
similar to the current federal standard, but applied to the
consuming public of a particular state rather than all fifty of
the United States. Three states have enacted a version of
the 2007 Model State Trademark Bill, which changed the
definition of “famous” to “widely recognized by the general
consuming public of [the] state or a geographic area within
[the] state.”35 That definition even more closely follows
federal law in its insistence on wide recognition by the
general consuming public, but opens up the possibility that
the geographic focus might be on a portion of the state
rather than the state as a whole. Finally, eleven states
currently have antidilution statutes that draw language
from the 1964 Model State Trademark Bill, which did not
explicitly require fame, but authorized injunctive relief
against the “likelihood of dilution” of the “distinctive
quality” of a mark.36 Although interpretation of this
language is not uniform, it is clear that the fame of a mark
is an important factor in determining whether the mark has
a “distinctive quality” that could be subject to dilution.37
While the fame of a brand name is quite well
established as a necessary condition of blanket protection
against brandname sharing, it also seems clear from the
statutes and cases that it is not a sufficient condition. It is
almost certain, for example, that the general consuming
public of the United States would recognize as famous
33. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
COMPETITION § 24:106 (4th ed. 2010).

ON

TRADEMARKS

AND

UNFAIR

34. Id. § 22:9; see DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL,
STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: 2009 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 79 (2009)
(“Table 11. StatebyState Comparison of Dilution Statutes”).
35. See MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 22:9.25; see also WELKOWITZ, supra note
34, at 79.
36. See MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 22:8; see also WELKOWITZ, supra note 34,
at 79.
37. See WELKOWITZ, supra note 27, at 3140 (discussing interpretation of
statutes modeled on the 1964 Trademark Bill).
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brand names like “American” and “United” for airline
transportation; yet, it is also virtually certain that the
owners of those marks could not obtain protection against
dilution.38 Exactly why they could not, and whether
additional conditions are properly framed as requirements
for eligibility or as factors in proving dilution, has been a
matter of contention. As we will detail below, it does seem
clear that two additional factors play a large role in
determining whether relief will be granted: the extent to
which a brand name is already shared among many users—
often referred to as the extent of “thirdparty use” in the
context of litigation between two users—and the degree of
distinctiveness of the brand name, along the traditional
spectrum from generic to coined. “American” and “United”
do not fare well with either of these two factors. They are
shared by many other businesses, and as applied to airline
services, the names do not seem to be particularly
distinctive: “American” seems to be descriptive of airline
transportation that is based and largely provided in
America, and “United” suggests that a number of
independent service providers may have been consolidated.
Yet it is not clear exactly how and why these facts should be
taken into account.
Consider, first, the degree of existing sharing, or third
party use. The FTDA originally treated thirdparty use as a
factor in determining whether a mark was famous, and
therefore entitled to dilution protection at all.39 The
Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA”) eliminated
thirdparty use as an explicit factor in determining fame,
but at the same time it added thirdparty use as an explicit
factor in determining whether the defendant’s use was
likely to cause dilution by blurring of the plaintiff’s famous
mark.40 Meanwhile, courts applying state dilution statutes
38. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999)
(remarking that not all famous marks exhibit the distinctiveness required for
dilution protection) (citing “American, National, Federal, Federated, First,
United, Acme, Merit, [and] Ace” as examples).
39. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 10498,
§3(c)(1)(G), 109 Stat. 985, 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)(G)
(1996)) (“In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as . . . the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties.”).
40. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109312,
§2(c)(2)(B)(iii), 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

152

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

that define dilution as a loss of “distinctive quality” have
found that thirdparty uses make a mark less distinctive or
weaker. For example, in the 1980 case of Amstar Corp. v.
Domino’s Pizza, Inc.,41 the Fifth Circuit, applying Georgia
law, considered whether the defendant’s use of the mark
“Domino” for pizza diluted the plaintiff’s use of the same
mark for sugar.42 It noted that the trial court record
contained evidence of seventytwo thirdparty federal
registrations for “Domino,” and evidence of another fifteen
thirdparty uses of the mark from 1885 to the present.43 The
court held that the plaintiff had no claim against the
defendant under Georgia’s antidilution statute because
“‘Domino,’ outside of plaintiff’s line of sugars and portion
control items, had already become a weak mark.”44 The
Court of Appeals of New York, interpreting the similarly
worded New York dilution statute in 1977, considered the
degree of thirdparty use as relevant to whether the
plaintiff’s use had gained secondary meaning, although it
seems that the court was treating “secondary meaning” as
akin to fame with the general public:
A quick glance at the New York City phone directories will reveal
the existence of at least 300 business entities in the metropolitan
area incorporating the word “allied” in their trade name. In light
of the large number of business entities using the generic term
allied in their trade name, it cannot be said that the name “allied”
has acquired a secondary meaning. We remain unconvinced that

§1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)) (“In determining whether a mark or trade name is
likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider . . . the extent to
which the owner of the famous mark is engaged in substantially exclusive use of
the mark.”).
41. 615 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1980).
42. Id. at 25455.
43. Id. at 259.
44. Id. at 265; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25,
cmt. e (1995) (“[A] trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by a
nonconfusing use [only] if the mark retains its source significance when
encountered outside the context of the goods or services with which the mark is
used by the trademark owner. . . . Concurrent use by others makes it unlikely
that consumers will form a single mental association between the mark and one
specific user.”).
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the public associates the word “allied” with the plaintiff’s cleaning
and maintenance service.45

Perhaps the relevance of thirdparty use can be
explained in terms of psychological theories of dilution
under which dilution is considered a particular phenomenon
that occurs in the minds of consumers.46 Yet it is also
possible that legislators and courts are reacting to more
disparate equitable factors. If the plaintiff adopted a brand
name that was already in common use at the time of
adoption, then it may seem that the plaintiff was not
particularly concerned about the uniqueness of its brand
name, and it should have to live with its decision.47 If 300
other businesses have chosen to adopt a particular brand
name, then it may seem unfair not to let the 301st business
do the same.
The same is true of the issue of distinctiveness. The
categorization of a mark along the continuum from generic
to fanciful has always been treated as relevant to dilution,
but exactly how and why has varied. The original FTDA
granted protection to marks that were “distinctive and
45. Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1166
(N.Y. 1977).
46. For example, consumers may make associations between trademarks and
certain types of products, such as an association between “Heineken” and “beer”;
on one theory, dilution is the weakening of those associations. See generally
Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical Measures for
an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 265 (2000); Sara Stadler Nelson,
The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 731 (2003). Or
maybe consumers make associations between trademarks and certain
desiderata, such as sportiness, luxury, or tradition, and dilution is the
weakening of those associations. See generally Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous
Trademarks and the Rational Basis for Protecting “Irrational Beliefs,” 14 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 605 (2007). Or perhaps consumers become familiar and
comfortable with whatever associations they make with particular marks, and
dilution is the weakening of this comfort. See generally Bradford, supra note 8.
Although they differ, these theories all seek to reduce dilution to one particular
type of phenomenon in the mind of the consumer, and contend that dilution
occurs if and only if that phenomenon occurs, which is why we dub them
“psychological theories.”
47. Cf. Sunbeam Lighting Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 183 F.2d 969, 972 (9th Cir.
1950) (“If, in [sic] course of our free enterprise, someone would market an
unworthy article outside plaintiff’s field bearing the name Sunbeam it must be
borne as not an unlikely circumstance following plaintiff’s selection of a non
fanciful word popular with commercial concerns.”).
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famous.”48 The Second Circuit, parting with some other
circuits,49 interpreted that language to mean that
distinctiveness was a requirement for protection separate
from fame,50 and later held that only marks which were
inherently distinctive could claim protection under the
FTDA.51 The TDRA then made clear that protection was not
limited to inherently distinctive marks,52 but at the same
time it made clear that the degree of inherent
distinctiveness—and of acquired distinctiveness—was a
factor relevant to determining whether dilution had
occurred.53
Here, too, one could attempt to explain the relevance of
this factor in terms of a psychological theory of dilution, or
one could understand it as an expression of more diverse
judgments regarding efficiency and equity. If a company
invests resources in coining a new word to serve as a brand
name, and thereby avoids depleting the finite stock of
existing words, then perhaps we should be less hesitant to
protect it against sharing, whether or not such sharing is
particularly likely to cause dilution by blurring. And if
another company chooses to adopt that coined word as a
brand name, it is more likely that it did so with the
intention of taking advantage of some of the luster with
which the first company imbued that name. For those who
think that the luster should belong to its creator, denying
use of the name to the second adopter seems the fair result.
48. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 10498, §3(a),
109 Stat. 985, 985 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1) (1996)).
49. See Times Mirror Mags., Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, LLC, 212 F.3d
157, 167 (3d Cir. 2000).
50. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 21516 (2d Cir. 1999).
51. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir.
2001).
52. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109312, §
2(c)(1), 120 Stat. 1730, 1730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1)
(2006)) (“[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against . . . use of
[that] mark . . . in commerce that is likely to cause dilution.”).
53. See id. § 2(c)(2)(B)(ii) (“In determining whether a mark or trade name is
likely to cause dilution by blurring, the court may consider all relevant factors,
including . . . [t]he degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous
mark.”).
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To complicate matters, the factors of fame, thirdparty
use, and distinctiveness are invariably listed by courts as
factors in determining the likelihood of confusion, and thus
also play a large role in determining the scope of trademark
infringement protection.54 If an arbitrary or fanciful brand
name is famous, and there are few other users, a court is
likely to grant infringement protection to the famous user
against more distant lines of business.55 Thus, from a
functional point of view one could see dilution protection
simply as an extension of infringement protection. Under
infringement law, fame, distinctiveness, and thinness of
thirdparty use all increase the subjectmatter scope of
protection. Dilution simply adds a categorical threshold: at
54. As every trademark law student soon learns, each circuit has its own list
of factors to consider in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion
between two marks, but they invariably include both thirdparty use and
distinctiveness, sometimes considered together as the factor of the “strength” of
the mark. See, e.g., AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir.
1979) (“the strength of the mark”); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287
F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (“the strength of [the] mark”); In re E.I. DuPont
DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[t]he number and
nature of similar marks in use on similar goods”).
55. To be sure, in the trademark infringement context, courts often state that
they consider thirdparty uses on similar goods and services much more relevant
than such uses on dissimiliar goods and services. See, e.g., Morningside Group
Ltd. v. Morningside Capital Group, L.L.C., 182 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“Use of a like mark in a different market for different products or services need
not undermine the mark’s strength in its own market.”); Century 21 Real Estate
Corp. v. Century Life of Am., 970 F.2d 874, 877878 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Some
courts have even stated that thirdparty uses on dissimilar goods and services
are completely irrelevant to the issue of infringement, such that evidence of
these uses is properly excluded. See Eclipse Assocs. Ltd. v. Data Gen. Corp., 894
F.2d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that it was not error to exclude
evidence of use of the plaintiff’s mark “Eclipse” in fields unrelated to computers,
such as floor cleaning products, commercial laundry folding equipment, and
industrial process heating equipment).
The focus on uses on similar goods and services potentially distinguishes the
inquiry into thirdparty uses in infringement cases from that in dilution cases.
However, when the issue is how broadly a mark is protected against merely
marginally similar uses, the number of thirdparty uses even on dissimilar
goods should be relevant. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:88 (4th ed. 2010) (“[S]ome evidence
of unrelated use is necessary where the alleged mark is in widespread use in
many fields, such as ACME, NATIONAL or PREMIUM. That is, evidence of
extensive third party use on a wide range of goods and services does tend to
weaken strength and narrow the scope of protection.”) (footnote omitted).
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some point, a level of fame, distinctiveness and rarity is
reached at which no other user can share the brand name.
If that threshold is set low, then the introduction of dilution
protection will have a substantial effect on brandname
sharing; but if it is set high, the introduction of dilution
protection will have a less noticeable effect.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT
A. The Dearth and Potential Relevance of Empirical Work
on BrandName Sharing
Because brandname sharing has been a feature of
commercial life for centuries, the challenges posed by recent
developments in trademark infringement and dilution law
should have generated a substantial body of research on
patterns and trends in brandname sharing. However,
virtually all of the empirical work done on trademark
infringement and dilution has focused on litigation, rather
than actual brandname uses in the marketplace.56 Indeed,
the only report we have found of research on brandname
sharing is a threeandahalf page article published in 1950
by George Kingsley Zipf, a Professor of Linguistics at
Harvard University.57
56. Empirical studies of trademark litigation include: Barton Beebe, The
Continuing Debacle of U.S. Antidilution Law: Evidence from the First Year of
Trademark Dilution Revision Act Case Law, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 449 (2008); Robert C. Bird, The Impact of the Moseley Decision on
Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 102 (2007); Justin J.
Gunnell, Goldilocks and the Three Federal Dilution Standards: An Empirical
Review, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 101 (2008); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (2006); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of
Trademark Law, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008).
57. George Kingsley Zipf, A Note on BrandNames and Related Economic
Phenomena, 18 ECONOMETRICA 260 (1950). Other significant studies on rates of
use of brand names, though not on rates of brandname sharing by multiple
businesses, includes a series of articles by Monroe Friedman on the frequency of
appearance of brand names in popular American novels, American and British
hit plays, and American newspapers. See generally Monroe Friedman, Brand
Name Use in News Columns of American Newspapers Since 1964, 63
JOURNALISM Q. 161 (1986); Monroe Friedman, Commercial Influences in Popular
Literature: An Empirical Study of Brand Name Usage in American and British
Hit Plays in the Postwar Era, 4 EMPIRICAL STUD. ARTS 63 (1986); Monroe
Friedman, The Changing Language of a Consumer Society: Brand Name Usage
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Zipf had previously undertaken a study of word use
frequency in spoken and written language. He had
demonstrated that a very small number of words account
for most word uses, and he devised a formula to predict the
frequency distribution of those uses, which became known
as “Zipf’s law.”58 Under Zipf’s law, the secondmost
frequentlyused word has onehalf the number of uses of the
mostfrequentlyused word; the third has onethird the
number of uses, and so on.59 Zipf sought out broader
applications of this formula of distribution of frequency, and
also attempted to explain the phenomenon of concentration
by means of a psychological “Principal of Least Effort,”
according to which human beings follow wellknown paths
that lead them to reuse familiar words.60 One of the
applications on which Zipf focused was brandname uses.
Zipf tallied the brandname uses in the 1947 edition of
Thomas’ Register of American Manufacturers, and found
that the frequency distribution of brand names in that
register roughly fit his formula.61 Unfortunately, his article
does not reveal what the most frequently used brand names
were, nor does it provide any other information about the
brandname uses that Zipf was tallying. Rather, the results
of his research were conveyed in a single sentence in his
article that reported the frequency distribution of brand
names in the 1947 Thomas’ Register.62
We think that empirical work on brandname sharing
might help to answer many interesting questions other than
whether their frequency distribution conforms to Zipf’s law.
Some of the most interesting questions concern the sharing
of famous brand names, precisely because trademark

in Popular American Novels in the Postwar Era, 11 J. CONSUMER RES. 927
(1985).
58. See generally Zipf, supra note 57.
59. Id.
60. See generally GEORGE KINGSLEY ZIPF, HUMAN BEHAVIOR
PRINCIPLE OF LEAST EFFORT (photo. reprint 1965) (1949).

AND

THE

61. See id.
62. See Zipf, supra note 57, at 261 (“The xnumber of different brandnames
in the United States (entire population in Thomas’ Register) used by the same y
number of firms is approximately inversely proportional to y2. [log y = 0.4711
log x 1.890; ±0.1587]”).
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dilution protection is typically granted only to such famous
names. These questions include:
As an historical matter, how common is it for brand
names that have one famous use to be shared by other
users? Are some types of famous brand names more
susceptible to multiple uses than others? Answers to these
questions would help us to better understand the
phenomenon of sharing of famous brand names, and would
provide a baseline against which changes can be measured.
Have there been changes in the rates of sharing of
famous brand names over time? In particular, is there any
evidence that the enactment of dilution laws, combined with
broader application of trademark infringement law, has
caused a reduction in the rate of sharing of famous brand
names? Answers to such questions would help us
understand how and why brandname sharing rates change,
and whether major legislative efforts to provide additional
protection against brandname sharing have been effective.
Is there any evidence that suggests that changes in
rates of sharing are caused by changes in the popularity of
the famous uses of those names? An answer to this question
would help us assess the validity of the contention, often
advanced by famous users of brand names, that other users
of that name have adopted it in an effort to benefit from the
popularity of the famous use.
Are high rates of sharing of a famous brand name
correlated with a shorter life of the famous use of that
brand name? Conversely, do famous uses of brand names
last longer if they are sparsely shared? Answers to these
questions would help us understand the gravity of the harm
that brandname sharing is claimed to do to famous uses of
those names.
We cannot hope with this initial study to provide
definitive answers to all of these questions, but we can
provide the first empirical study of brandname sharing and
begin to answer some of them.
B. The Scope and Design of the Study
The empirical study traced the number of uses of 131
different brand names in the white pages telephone books of
three urban jurisdictions—the city of Chicago, the New
York City borough of Manhattan, and the city of
Philadelphia—in six different years: 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990,
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2000, and 2010. As detailed below, we had reason to believe
that all of the 131 brand names had one use that would
qualify in some or all of those years as “famous to the
general consuming public of the United States,” thus
satisfying the postTDRA requirement for fame,63 which we
believe to be the most stringent fame requirement ever
incorporated into any state or federal law. Of those 131
brand names, we identified fortyfive names as having a use
that was proven to be consistently famous over virtually the
entire period of our study, since the use appeared both in a
national brand recognition study conducted in 1920 and
1921, and in a followup study conducted in 1997. In the
next two sections, we provide further detail about the brand
names selected, and about the scope and methodology of the
study.
1. The Brand Names Chosen for the Study. Most of our
brand names came from a study published in 1923, and a
followup study published in 1997. In 1920 and 1921, two
New York University professors, George B. Hotchkiss &
Richard B. Franken, conducted a study “of 100
representative commodities showing the names and brands
that are most familiar to the public.”64 Hotchkiss and
Franken surveyed 1,024 college students—512 men and 512
women. They provided their subjects with a list of 100
product categories, such as automobiles, canned fruits,
insurance, and hosiery, and asked them to list the most
prominent brands they associated with each category.65 The
responses of those subjects provide a snapshot of which
brand names were best known in their product markets in
the early 1920s. We excluded thirtyfour of those 100
product categories for one of four reasons. First, in thirteen
of the categories fewer than 10% of the subjects mentioned
any one brand name. In those cases, we decided, no brand
name was likely famous enough to merit study. Second, in
another thirteen cases, the product category itself has
become obsolete—consumers no longer buy corsets, or hair
tonic, or collars separate from shirts regularly enough that
a leading brand in those categories would likely be famous
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2006).
64. GEORGE BURTON HOTCHKISS & RICHARD B. FRANKEN, THE LEADERSHIP OF
ADVERTISED BRANDS: A STUDY OF 100 REPRESENTATIVE COMMODITIES SHOWING
THE NAMES AND BRANDS THAT ARE MOST FAMILIAR TO THE PUBLIC (1923).
65. Id. at 821.
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to the general public. Third, in seven cases, tracking brand
name uses posed particular difficulties. For example, the
leading brand of oil in the Hotchkiss study was “3 in 1,”
featuring numbers rather than words. Lastly, in one case,
involving the category of linen, the leading “brand”
mentioned by the subjects was “Irish,” which was in reality
not a brand but a place of origin.
That left us with sixtysix product categories from the
Hotchkiss and Franken study. We chose to track the top
brand in each of those categories. Because some brands
were leaders in more than one category—for example,
“Waterman” led in both ink and pens66—the Hotchkiss and
Franken study contributed fiftynine brand names.
In 1997, Professor Peter Golder published a followup
study, tracking the longevity of the Hotchkiss and Franken
brands in all 100 categories (though Golder also considered
some categories to be obsolete).67 Rather than conducting
another survey, Golder used market share information to
identify the most prominent brands in each category. In
twenty of the sixtysix categories we selected from the
Hotchkiss and Franken study, the leading brand identified
by Golder was the same brand identified as most prominent
by Hotchkiss and Franken. In the other fortysix categories,
it was different. However, in five cases, the new leading
brand in the Golder study had been a leading brand in a
different category in the Hotchkiss study.68 As a result, the
Golder study added fortyone new brand names to our list
(as explained below), for a total of 100 brand names from
the Hotchkiss and Golder studies.69
66. The other leaders in multiple categories included “Colgate,” which led in
shaving soap and toothpaste; “Goodyear,” which led in tires, raincoats, and
rubbers; and “Heinz,” which led in baked beans, jelly or jam, and spaghetti.
67. See generally Peter N. Golder, Historical Method in Marketing Research
with New Evidence on LongTerm Market Share Stability, 37 J. MKTG. RES. 156
(2000).
68. Those brands, listed with the category they newly led in Golder and
followed in parentheses by the category they led in Hotchkiss, include
“Campbell’s” in baked beans (soup); “Colgate” in toothbrushes (toothpaste);
“Cross” in pens (leather goods); “Gillette” in shaving soap (razors); and
“Hershey” in candies (chocolate).
69. In fact, the fortyone names we tracked from Golder include one further
subtraction and one addition. On the one hand, we did not add the new leader in
the category of hats in Golder (Logo Athletic). On the other hand, Golder
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Although the brand ranked number one in the
Hotchkiss study retained its preeminence in only twenty
categories included in the Golder study, the two studies
reveal a much greater degree of brand continuity if a
somewhat broader view is taken. This can be seen from two
perspectives: first, by examining the fate of the brands that
led in fortysix categories in Hotchkiss but failed to retain
their number one spot in Golder, and second, by examining
the provenance of the brands that became the new leaders
in those fortysix categories in Golder.
In the case of the Hotchkiss leaders that lost their top
spot, sixteen of them appear in prominent, but slightly
lower, positions in the Golder study—seven in the number
two spot, six at number three, and one each at numbers
four, five, and seven. Thus, in only thirty of the categories
do the Hotchkiss brands disappear completely in Golder.
And even then, “disappearing completely” likely carries too
weighty a connotation. Six of the thirty categories feature
brands that continue to appear in the Golder study in other
categories, often closely related categories. Those brands are
“Cross,” “Goodyear,” “Heinz,” and “Waterman.” Among the
brands in the remaining twentyfour categories, many, we
suspect, would still be found famous despite their failure to
appear in the Golder study. These include “Ivory” and
“Palmolive” soaps, “Camel” cigarettes, “Baker’s” cocoa,
“Crane” paper, and “B.V.D.” underwear. That leaves fewer
than twenty brands of the original sixtysix that have
simply ceased to exist.
In the case of the new brand leaders in the Golder
study, ten of the fortysix newly leading brands ranked
number one in the Golder study had appeared in the
Hotchkiss study—seven times as the number two brand,
twice as number three, and once as number six. Thus in
only thirtysix of the categories was Golder’s number one
brand completely new to that category. In three of those
thirtysix cases, the Golder number one brand, though
absent from the Hotchkiss study in that category, had
appeared as the number one brand in a different category in
the Hotchkiss study.70 Finally, of the thirtythree remaining
subdivided the category of pens to include a new category of inexpensive pens,
and we did add the leader in that new category, “Bic.”
70. Those brands, listed with the category they newly led in Golder and
followed in parentheses by the category they led in Hotchkiss, include “Colgate”
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brands, fourteen were already in use in 1920, at the time of
the Hotchkiss study, though they did not appear in that
study.71 Thus, only nineteen of the fortysix brands that
were new leaders in the Golder study commenced use after
the Hotchkiss study.72
To the 100 brands we found in the Hotchkiss and
Golder studies, we added thirtyone others, for a variety of
reasons. First, we consulted a wellknown review of
internationally famous trademarks by Interbrand, World’s
Greatest Brands, which rates the strength of hundreds of
diverse brands.73 It lists several older U.S. brands whose
prominence extended from the 1920s or 1930s. Where we
could confirm the longevity of their fame in the

in toothbrushes (toothpaste); “Cross” in pens (leather goods); and “Gillette” in
shaving soap (razors).
71. The date of first use data was gathered from trademark registrations filed
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.
72. Although it is sometimes difficult to obtain accurate information about
exactly when a particular use of a brand name commenced, it seems clear that
some famous uses of brand names in our study commenced after the first year of
our study, 1940, and of those, a few commenced after 1960, a year which we use
heavily for comparisons with the last year in our study, 2010. One might well
ask whether inclusion of such brand names in the study could lead to
misleading results, depending on one’s interpretive assumptions. For example, if
one were looking at the rates of independent uses of these brand names as
evidence of potential “freeriding” on the fame of the famous uses, it would
distort aggregate totals to include independent uses from a year in which the
famous use had not yet commenced. And if one were looking at rates of
independent uses for evidence of legal change that allowed famous users to
reduce independent uses, it would similarly distort aggregate totals to include
independent uses from a year in which the famous use had not yet commenced
(and hence a year in which the famous user could not have had any ability to
take legal action to enforce its trademark rights). Yet exclusion of new market
leaders identified in the Golder study could also be misleading, since declines in
independent uses of brand names that no longer had a famous use might be
misinterpreted as the result of greater legal protection, when in fact they had
been replaced by independent uses of brand names that were new market
leaders. In the face of all of these possibilities, we decided that we would include
brand names that had more recently gained fame, but would note separately the
changes in their use rates. It turns out that these brand names had little effect
on aggregate totals. See, e.g., infra note 115.
73. See generally INTERBRAND GROUP, WORLD’S GREATEST BRANDS: AN
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW BY INTERBRAND (1992).
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Encyclopedia of Consumer Brands,74 we added the
Interbrand trademarks to our list, including such marks as
“Bacardi,” “Chanel,” “IBM,” “MercedesBenz,” “Rolex,”
“Tampax,” and “Zippo.” Concerned that our list lacked
enough of the sort of luxury brand names most likely to be
objects of independent use, we consulted another source,
Icons of the American Marketplace,75 to see if we could
identify any longlived brands that might have attracted
more independent users than “ExLax” or “Tampax.” Once
again, after checking brand histories, we were able to add
“Cadillac” and “Harvard.” Finally, we included the three
iconic brands found in the legislative history generated by
the passage of the FTDA76 and used ubiquitously in
examples by commentators: “Buick,” “Bulova,” and
“Schlitz.”77
In addition to identifying famous marks that have held
their fame over time, we searched the 1923 study for a
number of additional marks that were once famous, but no
longer dominate the brand marketplace. We added three
marks that were famous in 1923, but have since lost their
luster: “Fatima” (cigarettes), “Packard” (cars), and “Uneeda”
(crackers).78 Here is the resulting list of the 131 brand
names the uses of which we traced:

74. See generally 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA
ed., 1994).

OF

CONSUMER BRANDS (Janice Jorgensen

75. AM. BENCHMARK PRESS, ICONS OF THE AMERICAN MARKETPLACE: CONSUMER
BRAND EXCELLENCE (2007) (listing the most valuable and famous brands in the
United States).
76. See H.R. REP. NO. 104374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1029, 1030 (offering Buick Aspirin, Dupont Shoes, and Kodak Pianos as
examples).
77. See MCCARTHY, supra note 33, at § 24:105 (“For example, the most
popular list of offending examples against which antidilution laws are directed
is: Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, Schlitz Varnish, Kodak pianos and Bulova
gowns.”).
78. In the Hotchkiss and Franken study, “Fatima” was the second most
recognized brand for cigarettes, behind “Camel.” See HOTCHKISS & FRANKEN,
supra note 64, at 145. “Packard” was the third most recognized brand name for
automobiles, behind “Ford” and “Cadillac.” See id. at 128. “Uneeda,” taken by
itself, was the single most recognized brand for crackers, although Hotchkiss
and Franken aggregated it with other “Nabisco” brands and deemed “Nabisco”
the most recognized brand. See id. at 153.
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Aiwa

Comet

Goodyear

Lipton

Rolex

Arbuckle’s
Yuban

Corvette

Green Giant

London Fog

RollsRoyce

B. V. D.

Crane

Guinness

Louisville Slugger

Royal

Bacardi

Creamette

Hammermill

Mack

Sanka

Baker’s

Crest

Hanes

Marlboro

Schlitz

Baldwin

Crisco

HarleyDavidson

Mazda

Seiko

BeechNut

Cross

Hart Schaffner &
Marx

Mennen

Sherwin
Williams

Bic

Del Monte

Harvard

MercedesBenz

Singer

Black and
Decker

Dial

Heinz

Metropolitan

Skoal

Borden

Diamond

Hershey

Nabisco

Smith and
Wesson

BreathSavers

Dole

Holeproof

Nestle

Smucker’s

Budweiser

Douglas

Huffy

Nike

Steinway

Buick

Dove

Huyler’s

O’Doul’s

Stetson

Bulova

Dr. Pepper

IBM

Old Dutch

Sunkist

Cadillac

Eagle

Indian

Oneida

Tampax

Camel

Elgin

Iver Johnson

Oreo

Tide

Campbell’s

Eveready

Ivory

Packard

Tiffany

Carnation

ExLax

Jack Daniels

Palmolive

Totes

Carter's

Fatima

JellO

Perrier

Uneeda

Chanel

Fels Naptha

Jif

Pontiac

Victor

Clabber Girl

Folger’s

Johnson & Johnson

Postum

Waterman

Clorox

Ford

Kellogg’s

Prophylactic

Welch’s

Coach

Freightliner

Kodak

Prudential

Winchester

CocaCola

General
Electric

L’Eggs

Remington

Windex

Colgate

Gillette

Levi Strauss

Rit

Wrigley

Colt

Gold Medal

LifeSavers

Rogers

Zales
Zippo

2. Information Sources, Coding Rules, and Methodology.
a. Telephone Books as Sources of BrandName Uses.
The primary information sources for our brandname
sharing study were white pages telephone books (which we
will hereafter call simply “telephone books.”) We chose
telephone books for a number of reasons. Over the period of
our study, we assume that almost all businesses of any size
had wireline telephone service. Telephone companies
generally had a default policy of publishing the telephone
number of every wireline subscriber in their telephone
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books without additional charge, because the availability of
phone numbers encouraged use of the telephone. We
assume that very few businesses would have opted for an
unpublished number, because they wanted customers and
potential customers to be able to find them easily. Thus,
telephone books should contain reasonably comprehensive
records of business names in the areas they cover.
Telephone books also provide snapshots of business
name uses in a particular year, thus enabling relatively
closegrained studies of trends over time. They do so
because they are typically issued on an annual basis, and
because whenever a business ceases to exist or changes its
name, the defunct listing is removed in the next annual
edition of the book. By comparison, trademark registers
reflect changes much more slowly, and are therefore
relatively poor information sources for time studies.
Trademark registrations on the federal trademark register,
for example, must be first renewed between five and six
years after initial registration, and thereafter only once
every ten years;79 before 1989, they only had to be renewed
once every twenty years.80 Thus, unless another business
takes affirmative action to have a defunct trademark
removed from the register on grounds of abandonment, it
can remain on the federal register for a decade after it has
become defunct, and before 1989 could have remained for
two decades. Telephone books are also typically issued for
particular jurisdictions, which is advantageous because we
can compare uses over time in a particular area, and can
use other data about that area to aid in analyzing results.81
One limitation of telephone books is that they usually
list telephone numbers by business name, and not all brand
names are business names. For example, four of the brand
names in the study—“Crest,” “Comet,” “Ivory,” and “Tide”—
are famously used on products made by “The Proctor &
Gamble Company,” not by “Crest Inc.,” “Comet Inc.,” “Ivory
79. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (2006).
80. See 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a) (1988).
81. We are aware that individuals and companies outside of the area covered
by a telephone book have been able to purchase listings in that book. However,
from observation we believe that to be a rare enough phenomenon not to
significantly distort most results, and in any event we believe that the
opportunity to purchase outofarea listings has been constant, so that the
results are not distorted by a change in policy.
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Inc.,” or “Tide Inc.” Some brandname uses are therefore not
represented in a telephone book. While we recognize that
telephone books are not complete records of brandname
uses, the problem is likely minor. Of the 131 brand names
in the study, 110 of them, or about 84%, appeared in the
telephone books we studied as authorized uses, that is, in
connection with the companies and products for which they
are famous. In addition, some companies make it a practice
to purchase an extra listing or a crossreference under their
most common brand names, so that consumers can more
easily find them. Thus, for example, in the telephone books
we looked at, the “Eastman Kodak Company” always had a
listing under “Kodak” as well as “Eastman Kodak.” Some
brandname uses are undoubtedly not represented in
telephone books, but as far as we know, there is no
information source that reliably lists all brandname uses in
a jurisdiction on a yeartoyear basis, so we have to live with
the limitations of available sources.
b. The Jurisdictions and Years Chosen. For this study,
we decided to look at telephone books from two cities,
Chicago and Philadelphia, and from the borough of
Manhattan in New York City. All three have had very large
populations and enormous commercial activity over the
time period covered by the study. As far as we can tell, they
also had stable geographical boundaries over that time
period. In addition, we believed that we could easily obtain
telephone books for these cities over our period of study.
We ended up looking at telephone books from all three
jurisdictions for six target years: 1940, 1960, 1980, 1990,
2000, and 2010. We chose 1940 as a baseline year before the
passage of the Lanham Act in 1946, and 1960 as a baseline
year before antidilution laws should have had much
impact. We then tracked uses once every decade beginning
in 1980.
c. Rules Defining What Counts as a BrandName Use.
We established a detailed set of rules to determine what
would count as a use of a brand name. The full set of these
rules is available as an appendix online;82 we present the
most important rules here.
Broad definition. Generally, any name that began
with one of 131 brand names in the study and that was
82. Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10.
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recognizably the name of a business was included. Thus,
“Campbell Joseph Inc.,” “Campbell Manufacturing Co.,”
“Campbell Market,” and “Campbell & Brown” would all be
counted as uses of the brand name “Campbell.” We also
included all instances in the singular, plural, and
possessive: “Campbell Market,” “Campbell’s Market,” and
Campbells Market” were all counted.
No individual professional listings. One common type
of listing in white pages telephone books features the full
name of an individual, followed by the name of a profession
or of goods or services in lower case letters, such as
“Campbell, Maria F. lawyer” or “Baldwin John G. metal
prods.” In earlier telephone books, these listings were
numerous and varied; in more recent books, they are less
frequent, and usually limited to lawyers and doctors. These
listings were excluded from the study, on the ground that
they did not provide enough evidence that the individual’s
name was being used as a brand name.
No alternate spellings or variants. We did not attempt
to track alternate spellings of brand names, such as
“Douglass,” or “Forde,” or other names that looked or
sounded similar; only the exact brand names were included.
This may well result in some undercounting, but a search
for all similar variants would both require resources that we
did not have, as well as additional rules for determining
similarity that would be very difficult to formulate and
apply consistently.
First word uses only. We only searched for brand
names when they were listed as the first word of the
company name in the telephone book. Thus, for example,
“Flowers by Campbell,” “Brown & Campbell,” and “Joseph
Campbell & Sons” would not be included as uses of the
brand name “Campbell.” On the other hand, businesses
often choose to be listed with their dominant brand name
first—there may be listings for “Campbell Flowers By” and
“Campbell Joseph & Sons”—and in that case they would be
included.
Geographical and Semantic Compounds Excluded. We
did not count the occurrence of one of the names in our
study as a brandname use when it was immediately
followed by another word and the two words together
formed a local place name. For example, three of the brand
names in the study are “Douglas,” “Ford,” and “Rogers”;
Chicago has neighborhoods called “Douglas Park” and
“Rogers Park,” and a shopping mall called “Ford City.”
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Many businesses incorporate those complete place names in
their own names; for example, we came across “Douglas
Park Dollar and Food,” “Ford City Bowling Center,” and
“Rogers Park Fine Wines and Spirits.” Following an
established rule of trademark law that “unitary marks” are
to be considered as a whole,83 we decided that each of these
twoword place names would be experienced as a whole, and
we therefore did not count uses of them as uses of the brand
names “Douglas,” “Ford,” and “Rogers.”
Similarly, some brand names can be used as modifiers
in semantic compounds. In our experience, the brand name
that was used in this way most often was “Cross.” “Cross” is
a family name, and the famous use which placed it in our
study is “Cross Pens,” named after Alonzo Townsend Cross,
the son of the company’s founder. However, as a modifier,
“cross” can also mean “across,” “between” or “covering the
whole of,” and we found many businesses named, for
example, “Cross Country Van Lines,” “Cross Cultural
Consulting,” and “Cross Roads Travel Service.” Following
the same principle that composites are to be taken together,
we decided not to count these as uses of the brand name
“Cross.” On the same logic, we also did not count such
phrases as “Dial A Job,” “Dial A Mattress,” and “Dial a
Prayer” as uses of “Dial.”
Branches and departments not counted as separate
uses. Many telephone books contain multiple telephone
number listings for a given business name, often because
the business has multiple branches in different locations in
the city, or has a number of different departments under a
single main listing. We sometimes kept track of how many
branches a business had, but for purposes of this study we
did not count branches or departments as separate brand
name uses. Thus, a business name could only count as one
use of a brand name in that telephone book, no matter how
many branches or departments it had. We did, however,
count different affiliated companies separately: for example,
“General Electric Credit Corp.” and “General Electric XRay
Corp.” were counted as two separate (authorized) brand
name uses. Thus, it is possible for a single telephone book to
generate more than one authorized use.
83. See, e.g., Dena Corp. v. Belvedere Int’l Inc., 950 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir.
1991); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 1213.05 (6th ed. May 2010) [hereinafter TMEP].
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d. Information About and Classification of BrandName
Uses. For each brandname use found in a telephone book, a
record was created. Each record includes the full name of
the use found (e.g. “Campbell Foundry Co.”); the brand
name of which it is a use (“Campbell”); the city and year of
the telephone book in which the use was found; and an
indication of whether the use was “Authorized,”
“Independent,” or “Unclear.”84
A brandname use is “Authorized” if it is a use made by
the company that made the name famous in the studies we
consulted, or by an affiliated or successor company or a
licensee. A use is also “Authorized” if it is probably a
nominative use, whether or not it is actually licensed. For
example, “Corvette Auto Repairs,” for a business specialized
in repairing “Chevrolet Corvettes,” would be considered
“Authorized” whether or not the use is licensed by General
Motors. Any other use of the brand name as a business
name is “Independent”—unauthorized by the owner of the
famous use of the name and not a nominative use of that
famous brand.
Making judgments about whether a use is authorized or
independent when presented only with information
available in a telephone book may seem a difficult task. In
practice, however, we think that in most cases it is possible
to make very good guesses. In part, we were aided by the
fact that telephone books contain business names, and
business names are often longer than the brand names of
their products—for example, the company responsible for
making “Heinz” a famous brand name for food products is
the “H. J. Heinz Company,” not “Heinz Tailors.” Telephone
books also often contain short descriptions of the lines of
business of the companies listed, such as “Heinz Mfg. Co.
aluminum extrusions.” True, some companies have become
quite diversified, and in a number of cases we did additional
research that identified that diversification. For example,
the company that made “Borden” famous for milk at one
time produced a wide variety of chemicals, and the company
that produced “Colt” guns has manufactured many other

84. Each record also contains a number of fields intended to aid the research
process, such as a field for noting later modifications of the record, and a field
identifying the record’s author.
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things as well.85 Nevertheless, we think it unlikely that a
company such as the “H.J. Heinz Co.” ever owned a local
tailor’s shop, dry cleaners, or pharmacy, and thus in
practice we are confident that our classifications are in very
large part accurate. In those cases where we remained
unsure even after additional research, we marked the use
“Unclear,” and did not count it as either an “Authorized” use
or an “Independent” one. Between two and three percent of
the uses landed in the “Unclear” category.
e. Methodology. The initial database entries were made
by student research assistants, who were instructed as to
the rules for inclusion and classification of brandname
uses. Robert Brauneis then personally checked every
database entry against the original sources, and made
several thousand changes, including additions, deletions,
and modifications. In some cases, issues that we had not
anticipated arose as the work was done, and we formulated
and distributed additional rules.
III. INDEPENDENT USES OF FAMOUS BRAND NAMES: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY RESULTS
This Part of the Article will summarize the results of
the empirical study. Because the study is concerned
primarily with the sharing of brand names, we will focus
mainly on uses of the brand names that were independent
of the famous uses of those names. We will first consider
totals across all brand names, cities, and years, and then
analyze the data by type of brand name, by city, and by
year.
85. It turned out also to be important to recognize that many of the
companies that made the brand names in our study famous also built buildings
in the cities we studied. Thus, there are or were “General Electric,” “Postum,”
“RollsRoyce,” “Singer,” and “Steinway” buildings in New York; “Palmolive,”
“Prudential,” and “Wrigley” buildings in Chicago; and a “Packard” building in
Philadelphia. We treated all uses made in connection with those buildings as
authorized uses. More recently, a number of automobile companies have
participated in the revival of the theater district in Chicago, and so the
“Cadillac” Palace Theatre and the “Ford” Center for the Performing Arts are not
independent uses, but are officially sponsored by the Cadillac Division of
General Motors and the Ford Motor Company, respectively. On the other hand,
the “Pontiac” Building in Chicago has never had any connection with the
Pontiac Division of General Motors, and so the few uses connected with that
building were treated as independent.
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A. Totals
In total, in the six years and three cities covered by our
study, we identified 14,249 uses of the study’s 131 brand
names. Of these, 1,221 were “authorized” uses, 12,779 were
“independent” uses, and 249 were “unclear.” Thus, each
brand name had an average of 109 uses, of which about nine
were authorized, ninetyeight were independent, and two
were unclear.86 Those averages, however, mask a very wide
variation between brand names. Although each brand name
generated on average ninetyeight independent uses, the
median number of independent uses per brand name was
only nine; thirtythree of the 131 brand names generated
zero independent uses, fiftynine of the brand names less
than five uses, and seventyone of the brand names less
than eighteen, or less than one per telephone book.87 Only
twentyfive brand names generated more than the average
number of ninetyeight independent uses. The brand name
“Royal” accounted for the most independent uses, 2,086 or
16.32% of the total; second came “Metropolitan,” with 1583
uses, 12.39% of the total. Rounding out the top five were
“Diamond,” 1,170 uses and 9.16%; “Eagle,” 1,069 uses and
8.37%; and “Baker,” 674 uses and 5.27%.88 These top five
together account for 51.51% of all independent uses.
This may seem like an extraordinary concentration of
uses in a very few brand names, but concentration on that
order is not unusual. Indeed, in the study undertaken by
George Kingsley Zipf, discussed above, the distribution of
brandname uses was concentrated even more tightly in the
most popular names, roughly following what has become
known as “Zipf’s Law.” 89 The distribution of frequency of use
among brand names in our sample does not quite fit Zipf’s
Law, because the curve is flatter—for example, the number
of uses of the secondmostprevalent brand name is 76% of
the number of uses of the mostprevalent name, and the
number of uses of the thirdmostprevalent brand name is
74% of the number of uses of the secondmostprevalent
name. However, the distribution still shows a great deal of
86. Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (spreadsheet Author Ct + Cell Check).
87. Id. (spreadsheet CountsTotalRankByCity rows 13539).
88. Id. (spreadsheet CountsTotalRankByCity).
89. See Zipf, supra note 57, at 263.
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concentration, and the fact that the curve is flatter could
just mean that the sample does not contain the most
frequently used brand names in the United States, which is
quite likely.90
B. Types of Brand Names
Brand names can be classified in numerous ways. When
studying words, linguists often consider four different
components: phonology, orthography, morphology, and
semantics.91 With respect to brand names, one could
consider how variations of each of these components
correlated with rates of sharing. We will not consider here
matters of phonology—of how brand names sound—or of
orthography—of how brand names are spelled. We will,
however, consider some aspects of morphology—of how
brand names are formed, and of semantics—of what brand
names mean. Specifically, we will consider rates of sharing
of three different groups of brand names: 1) single lexical
words, that is to say, words that have a meaning defined in
dictionaries;92 2) family names—names that occurred in the
telephone books we studied as family names of individuals;
and 3) words that fit into neither of the first two categories,
because they are acronyms or compound, derived, coined, or
foreign words.
1. Lexical Words. Twentyfive of the 131 brand names in
the study, or 19% of those names, are lexical words. Though
they account for a roughly proportionate share of authorized
uses (20.29%), they account for 68.90% of the independent
uses.93 The top five brand names—“Royal,” “Metropolitan,”
“Eagle,” “Diamond,” “Baker,” and “Victor”—are all lexical
words. Although Royal, Eagle and Diamond are found as
family names, Royal and Eagle are quite uncommon as
90. For example, “American,” “United,” “National,” and “Acme” were not
among the 131 brands studied.
91. Tina M. Lowrey et al., The Relation Between BrandName Linguistic
Characteristics and BrandName Memory, 32 J. ADVER. 7, 7 (2003).
92. Linguists often use the term “generic word” as a synonym for “lexical
word,” but we have chosen to avoid the word “generic” in this context because of
its prominence and different meaning in trademark law.
93. Brauneis
&
LexicalRankByCity).
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family names, and Diamond is only moderately common.94
Thus, Baker is the first name on the list that probably owes
much of its frequency to its use as a family name.95 Only two
lexical words, “prophylactic” and “skoal,” generated no
independent uses at all. One can only guess that in the
former case, the fact that “prophylactic” has become a
euphemism for “condom” is a great deterrent to its use as a
brand name (and likely played a role in the demise of the
oncefamous brand of toothbrush). In the latter case, the
relative obscurity of the imported term and its use in
connection with chewing tobacco are probable factors.96
Twentytwo of the other twentythree lexical words
generated at least the median number of nine independent
uses, and fourteen of them generated more than the average
number of ninetyeight independent uses. It should be no
surprise that a lexical word is more likely to be adopted by
multiple independent entities as a brand name, but these
figures give some sense of the magnitude of increased
likelihood.
94. We counted individual residential listings for all brand names in the 1960
and 2010 telephone books. We found sixty of the 131 brand names in the study
as family names in those individual residential listings. The total number of
residential listings featuring those family names in the 1960 books were 12,458.
“Campbell,” the most frequently found family name, accounted for 1905 listings
or 15.29% of the total, and the top five names accounted for 60% of the total.
“Diamond,” with 435 listings, accounted for 3.5% of the total; “Royal,” with fifty
two listings, accounted for 0.42% of the total; and “Eagle,” with thirtyseven
listings, accounted for 0.30% of the total. Id. (spreadsheet Surname People
Totals Ranked).
95. “Baker” was the thirdmostfrequently found name among the sixty
family names we found in the 1960 telephone books, with 1517 listings
accounting for 12.18% of the total. Id.
96. We checked the frequency of word uses in Mark Davies, Corpus of
Contemporary
American
English,
AMERICANCORPUS.ORG,
http://www.americancorpus.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). Of all of the twenty
five lexical word brand names, “skoal” occurs least frequently in the Corpus of
Contemporary American English, appearing only fortynine times.
“Prophylactic” is the third leastfrequent, at 275 uses, with “carnation,” at 232
uses, in between. By contrast “royal,” for example, occurs 13,113 times. We
checked to see whether there was any correlation, either negative or positive,
between the rate of sharing of a lexical brand name and its frequency of use in
English, as measured in the Corpus of Contemporary English. It turns out the
relationship is almost so weak as to be random: a regression resulted in an R
Square value of 0.0109 and a pvalue of 0.6192. Brauneis & Heald, supra note
10 (spreadsheet CountsLexicalRankByCity).
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2. Family names. Sixty of the 131 brand names, or
about 46%, were found as family names in at least one
telephone book in our study in 1960 or 2010. Some of them,
such as Campbell, Carter, Baker, Ford and Rogers, were
quite common, and others, such as Chanel, Comet, Crest,
Huyler, and Smucker, were exceedingly uncommon.97 This
list would have been longer had we not made a judgment
call about brand names that consist of two or more personal
names strung together. Eleven of the brand names in our
study fit that description: “Black and Decker,” “Harley
Davidson,” “Hart Schaffner & Marx,” “Iver Johnson,” “Jack
Daniels,” “Johnson & Johnson,” “Levi Strauss,” “Mercedes
Benz,” “RollsRoyce,” “SherwinWilliams,” and “Smith and
Wesson.” We decided that in four of those cases, the first
name in the string was used often enough by itself to
identify the brand that it would be useful to track it
separately. Those include Harley, Levi, Mercedes, and Rolls.
In the remaining cases, we concluded, it was not useful to
track any of the names by themselves, since “Smith and
Wesson” guns, for example, are never known as “Smiths,”
nor are “Black and Decker” flashlights known as “Blacks.”
There is a substantial overlap between family names
and lexical words: Eighteen brand names in the study fall
within both the group of twentyfive that are lexical words
and the group of sixty that are family names. Therefore, it
may be useful to consider those both together with and
97. Five other brand names in our study appear as (very rare) family names
in the 2000 United States Census, although we did not find them in any of the
telephone books we searched: Crisco, Mennen, Oneida, Sanka, and Zippo. Three
brand names were in fact the family names of the company founders, but appear
neither in the 2000 United States Census nor in the telephone books we
consulted: Bacardi, Bulova, and Nestlé. Although “O’Doul” sounds like an Irish
name, it in fact does not exist in Ireland, and was apparently invented by the
father of American baseball player Lefty O’Doul, who changed his name from
Doul. See Lefty O’Doul, EVERYTHING2 (Oct. 10, 2001, 4:32:08),
http://everything2.com/title/Left+O%2527Doul (follow “Lefty O’Doul” hyperlink).
As a result, there are exceedingly few people bearing the family name O’Doul,
and it does not appear in the 2000 United States Census. Other brand names
were derived from the family name(s) of the founder(s) through clipping (“Baron
Bich” became “Bic”) amending (Charles William Post made “Postum”) or
abbreviation (“Bradley Voorhees & Day” became “B.V.D.”). See Marcel Bich,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marcel_Bich (last visited Dec. 11, 2010);
C.W.Post, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_William_Post (last
visited Dec. 11, 2010); BVD, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BVD (last
visited Dec. 11, 2010).
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separately from the family names that are not lexical
words.98 Of the 12,925 independent uses of the brand names
in the study, 10,344, or 81%, were uses of names that we
also found as family names.99 However, 7,060 of those uses
were of the eighteen names that were also lexical words,
whereas only 3,284 of those uses were of the fortytwo
names that are not lexical words. As we mentioned above,
while some of the names that are lexical words probably
have high rates of sharing due to their use as family
names—Baker, Victor, and Singer are prominent among
these—others, such as Royal, Eagle, and Crest, are less
likely to own much of their popularity to such use. Of the
fortytwo brand names that are family names but not lexical
words, the top six collectively account for 60% of the 3,284
uses of names that fall under that description. Those
names, which are all relatively common family names, are
Rogers, Campbell, Carter, Douglas, Mack, and Baldwin. We
will have more to say about the correlation between the rate
of familyname use and the rate of brandname use in Part
IV below.
3. Acronyms and Compound, Derived, Coined, and
Foreign Words. Fortytwo of the 131 brand names in the
study are neither single lexical words nor family names.
Twelve are compound names, formed by juxtaposing two
lexical words, such as “BreathSavers,” “General Electric,”
“Gold Medal,” “London Fog,” or “Old Dutch.” Twentysix
would probably qualify under modern trademark doctrine
as “coined” or “fanciful” words.100 Some of these are quite
recognizably formed from lexical words by processes of
derivation, blending, or clipping: thus “Windex” is a brand
of window cleaner, “Palmolive” a brand of soap, and “Ex
Lax” a brand of laxative. Others have little perceptible
relationship to any lexical word: “Bic,” “Kodak,” and “Oreo,”
for example, are unlikely to call any particular meaning to
mind. Two brand names, “B.V.D.” and “IBM,” are acronyms,
98. A family name that is also a lexical word would, for example, be unlikely
to qualify as “primarily merely a surname” under federal trademark law. 15
U.S.C. § 1052(e)(4) (2006).
99. See Brauneis &
BrandNamesSurnames).
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100. See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th
Cir. 1983) (providing the four traditional categories of trademark
distinctiveness).
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and another two, “Aiwa” and “Seiko,” are of foreign—in this
case Japanese—derivation.101
Only four of these fortytwo brand names ever
generated a substantial number of independent uses. Those
four were “Eveready” (ninety uses), “Uneeda” (sixtysix
uses) “Gold Medal” (fortynine uses), and “Old Dutch”
(thirtytwo uses).102 Of those, however, only “Gold Medal”
has remained relatively steady, with ten independent uses
in 1960 and eight in 2010. “Eveready” dropped from twenty
one independent uses in 1960 to six in 2010; “Uneeda” from
twentyseven independent uses in 1960 to two in 2010; and
“Old Dutch” from twelve in 1960 to one in 2010.103
Of the other thirtyeight brand names in those
categories, twenty never generated a single independent
use, and in 2010, thirtyfour of the thirtyeight names had
zero independent uses and the other four only had one. It is
clear, then, either that most coined names are simply not
attractive to wouldbe imitators, or that they enjoy broad
trademark protection, and those who have coined them take
advantage of that protection.
C. Cities
Of the 12,779 independent uses found in the study,
6,687, or 52%, were found in Manhattan; 4,040 (32%) were
found in Chicago, and 2,052 (16%) were found in
Philadelphia.104 Thus, Manhattan generated by far the
largest number of independent uses, even though over the
time period covered by the study, the population of Chicago
was much larger, and that of Philadelphia began modestly
101. Under the “doctrine of foreign equivalents” of U.S. trademark law, foreign
terms should be translated into English and then treated as those English
terms would be. TMEP, supra note 83, § 1207.01(b)(vi). In the case of “Seiko,”
however, that seems unlikely to lead to a single definite meaning; according to
Seiko’s official company history, in Japanese, the word means “‘exquisite,’
‘minute,’ or ‘success.’” JOHN GOODALL, A JOURNEY IN TIME: THE REMARKABLE
STORY OF SEIKO 9 (2003). Seiko, as a girl’s name means “sincere child.” Name:
Seiko, NICKELODEON PARENTS CONNECT, http://babynamesworld.parentsconnect.
com/meaning_of_Seiko.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
102. See Brauneis
DerivedByYear).
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larger and ended modestly smaller. In 1940, Manhattan had
a population of 1,889,924, whereas Chicago had a
population of 3,396,808 and Philadelphia a population of
1,913,334.105 By 2009, the estimated population of
Manhattan was 1,629,054,106 while the estimated population
of Chicago in 2006 was 2,833,321,107 and the 2006 estimated
population of Philadelphia was 1,448,394.108 The greater
number of independent uses per capita in Manhattan
probably reflects the fact that Manhattan is the business
center of a metropolitan area that is substantially larger
than those of Chicago or Philadelphia.
D. Time
The most dramatic perspective on the independent use
data gathered in this study may be that of change over time.
Across all three jurisdictions, the number of independent
uses increased between 1940 to 1960 from 2,293 to 3,000, an
increase of 31%. Thereafter, however, independent uses
steadily declined: 2,456 in 1980; 2,033 in 1990; 1,617 in
2000; and 1,380 in 2010.109 Thus, between 1960 and 2010,
independent uses declined by 54%. Although there is some
variation between the study’s three jurisdictions, they
follow the same basic trend. Chicago posted the largest
percentage decline, 60%, from 938 to 374 uses. Philadelphia
105. For the populations of Chicago and Philadelphia, see Campbell Gibson,
Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United
States: 1790 to 1990 tbl.17 (U.S. Bureau of the Census Population Div., Working
Paper No. 27, 1998), available at http://www.census.gov/population/
www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html; for the population of Manhattan,
which is New York County in the State of New York, see Richard L. Forstall,
New York Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 27, 1995), http://www.census.gov/population/www
/censusdata/cencounts/files/ny190090.txt.
106. State & County QuickFacts: New York County, New York, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/36061.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2010).
107. State & County QuickFacts: Chicago (city), Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/1714000.html (last visited Nov. 16,
2010).
108. State & County QuickFacts: Philadelphia (city), Pennsylvania, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/42/4260000.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2010).
109. See Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (spreadsheet Timechart).
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declined by 51%, from 483 uses to 235 uses, and Manhattan
also declined by 51%, from 1579 uses to 771 uses.110 These
changes are graphically represented in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
Independent Uses of 131 Brand Names in Three
Jurisdictions, 19402010111

These declines were spread broadly across the 131
brand names in the study. Only fifteen of the 131 names
had a greater number of independent uses in 2010 than in
1960. Of those, eight were merely increases from zero uses
to one use, and the others all involved brand names with
relatively low numbers of independent uses.112 The largest
single gain was posted by the brand name “Tiffany,” which
had six independent uses in 1960 and nineteen in 2010, a
gain of thirteen.113 Meanwhile, seventyone of the 131 brand
names, which collectively accounted for 98.47% of the
110. See id.
111. The numbers for 1950 are averages of those for 1940 and 1960, rather
than being based on empirical research; similarly, the numbers for 1970 are
averages of the numbers for 1960 and 1980. They were inserted to maintain a
uniform time scale across the figure.
112. See Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (spreadsheet CountsUnauthChange
19602010).
113. Id.
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independent uses in 1960 and 93.62% of the independent
uses in 2010, saw declines in such uses.114 Fortyfive of the
131 names had zero independent uses in both 1960 and
2010; these names accounted for the number of uses of
which remained the same.115 Thus, the last halfcentury saw
a broad, steep decline in the number of independent uses of
the famous brand names represented in this study. We now
turn to the task of examining why this change occurred.
IV. NONLEGAL CAUSES OF THE DECLINE IN INDEPENDENT
USES OF BRAND NAMES
Part I of this Article explained that over the past five or
six decades, trademark infringement protection has
expanded and trademark dilution protection has arisen,
giving owners of trademark rights in brand names,
especially famous brand names, additional powers to
prevent sharing of those names. Part III of this Article
showed, among other things, that independent uses of the
131 brand names tracked in an empirical study have
declined sharply and broadly over that same time period.
One might conclude that increased trademark protection
was entirely or largely responsible for the decline. The
truth, however, is likely to be more complicated. First, many
other factors may be at play, and it is important to consider
what they might be, and to see whether we can estimate
their likely influence. Second, the effect of legal change is
likely to emerge incrementally in the market, so we must
consider how quickly changes in law could have an effect on
brandname sharing rates, and which brandname users
could take advantage of those legal changes. We will
consider the role of trademark law in the next Part. This
Part will investigate three possible nonlegal factors that
could affect brandname sharing rates: 1) economic changes
in the municipalities studied; 2) family migration, which is
made relevant by the many family names represented
114. Id.
115. Id. As far as we can tell, seven of the 131 brand names in the study had
famous uses that commenced after 1960: “Aiwa,” “Bic,” “BreathSavers,”
“Coach,” “L’Eggs,” “Nike,” and “O’Douls.” Of these, five had no independent uses
in either 1960 or 2010. “Coach” had four independent uses in 1960, and six in
2010; “Nike” had zero independent uses in 1960, and one in 2010. Id. Thus,
these brand names had very little effect on the aggregate totals. For further
discussion of such brand names, see supra note 72.
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among the 131 names in our study; and 3) the possible
decline in popularity over time of the brands studied. It will
also briefly consider two other possible nonlegal factors—
structural shifts in the popularity of business name types
and the cultural swing towards personalization.
A. Economic Changes
It is possible that the total number of businesses
operating in the three jurisdictions in the study declined
between 1960 and 2010. If that were true (assuming a
stable distribution of brand names among those businesses),
the number of businesses that shared any one brand name
would decrease. Most obviously, the economies of the cities
in question may have shrunk, resulting in a decline in the
number of businesses. Second, the average size of the
businesses in those cities may have increased and displaced
multiple smaller businesses. For example, many
independent pharmacies may have been replaced by
branches of a single company that operates pharmacies
under one brand name, such as “Walgreens,” “CVS,” or “Rite
Aid.” For the year 1960, the project database contains
twelve names of businesses that begin with one of the 131
brand names in the study and end with words like
“Pharmacy,” “Pharmacists,” “Druggist,” or “Drug Store”; by
2010, that number has dropped to six.116 That decline may
well be attributable to consolidation, rather than economic
shrinkage or legal change. Another related possibility is
that independently branded businesses were replaced by
franchises that are independently owned but operated
under a single brand name, such as “SevenEleven,”
“Burger King,” or “Holiday Inn.”117
Given limitations on available economic data,118 we
decided to return to the telephone books and use the
116. See Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (spreadsheet BusinessTypes).
117. Many franchisors operate on a mixed basis, owning some of the locations
that use the brand name, and licensing the brand name to owners of other
locations. For a report on the top 200 franchisors and the percentage of locations
to which each of them licenses the brand name through a franchise agreement,
see 2008 Franchise Times: Top 200 Franchise Systems, FRANCHISETIMES.COM
(Oct.
2008),
http://www.franchisetimes.com/pdf/FranchiseTimes2008Top
200.pdf.
118. Economic censuses have been conducted in the United States since 1810,
but they have two limitations that impede their usefulness for this project.
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number of overall business listings as a proxy for both
economic shrinkage and business consolidation. We
estimated the total number of brandname uses that
appeared in the 1960 and 2010 white pages telephone books
in all three jurisdictions. If the total number of brandname
uses in the telephone books exhibited the same percentage
decline as did the independent uses of the 131 brand names
in our study, then the decline of independent uses would
seem to be explained by some combination of economic
contraction, economic concentration, or franchising activity.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to count or accurately
estimate the total number of brandname uses in white
pages telephone books. Counting is an extremely labor
intensive process: the telephone books in the study have on
average about 1300 pages, and each page has upwards of
400 listings. We simply did not have the resources to
undertake an actual count. An accurate estimate is also
tricky. Most of the telephone books mix residential and
First, before 1948, regular economic censuses were limited for the most part to
manufacturing industries, and thus excluded economic activity in retail,
wholesale, transportation, communication, and other service industries. See
William F. Micarelli, Evolution of the United States Economic Censuses: The
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 15 GOV’T INFO. Q. 335, 358 (1998). In 1948,
the Bureau of the Census conducted the first census of the retail and wholesale
trades, and of selected service industries, but this census continued to exclude
some service industries that are particularly important to large cities, including
the finance, insurance, and real estate industries. Those industries were not
added until 1992, when a large expansion of the scope of the economic census
enabled it to cover industries accounting for 98% of the gross domestic product
of the United States, expanded from about 75% of GDP in 1987. Id. at 372; see
also Paul T. Zeisset, Disseminating Economic Census Data, 15 GOV’T INFO. Q.
303, 314 (1998). Because the scope of the economic census excluded a
substantial percentage of economic activity until 1992, it is difficult to use
census data to make historical comparisons regarding businesses of all types
before that year.
Second, the basic unit of the economic census is the “establishment,” defined as
“a business or industrial unit at a single geographic location that produces or
distributes goods or services—for example, a factory, store, or hotel.” Shirin A.
Ahmed et al., Conducting the Economic Census, 15 GOV’T INFO. Q. 275, 280
(1998). The key here is the idea of a “unit at a single geographic location”; many
establishments may be owned by the same company, or a company may only
own a single establishment. The economic census does not provide information
about company or firm ownership of establishments at the city level. Therefore,
we cannot draw conclusions about ownership patterns from census information.
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business listings in alphabetical order. The mix is very
“lumpy”—pages listing popular family names can contain
almost entirely residential listings, pages listing popular
business names or acronyms can contain almost entirely
business listings, and one can find pages with a wide
variety of residential to business ratios in between those
two extremes. Nor is it easy to generate a random sample,
since each telephone book has a different number of pages
and the number of listings per page varies widely, since
some listings take up more space on the page than others.
We settled on counting the number of brandname uses
on telephone book pages that covered the alphabetical range
from approximately Bac to Ban, and then extrapolating
from those results. This alphabetical range seemed not to be
uncharacteristically dominated by either business or
residential listings—it did not contain a business name like
“American,” or a family name like “Smith”—but we must
admit that we lack a means for testing whether it is closely
representative of the entire book. This alphabetical range
occupies as many as ten pages in the 1960 Manhattan
telephone book (which mixes residential and business
listings), but only a single page in the 2010 Chicago and
Philadelphia books (which have separate sections for
residential and business listings, although the business
section still contains many individual professional listings
that we did not count as brandname uses).
The estimates so generated suggest that the total
number of brandname uses represented in the telephone
books did indeed decline between 1960 and 2010, as shown
in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Brand Name Uses in White Pages Telephone Books119

119. For independent use data, see Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10
(spreadsheet TimeChart); for estimated total brand names in white pages
telephone books, see id. (workbook TelephoneBooksListingsCounts.xlsx).
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1960
Estimated
Total

Independent
Uses of

Percentage

2010
2010
Estimated

Studied
Names

Total

Independent
Uses of
Studied
Names

Chicago

69505

938

64242

374

Manhattan

118012

1579

101463

771

Philadelphia

42273

483

36581

267

183

Percentage
Change
Total

Change
Independent
Uses of
Studied
Names

7.57%

60.13%

14.02%

51.17%

13.46%

51.35%

However, Table 1 also shows that independent uses of
the brand names in our study declined far more
dramatically than brand names generally, and that the
relationship between the two types of decline varies widely.
In Philadelphia, independent uses of studied brand names
declined at a bit less than four times the rate of the total
decline, whereas in Chicago the studied brand name uses
declined at over seven times the rate of the total decline.
Thus, it seems quite clear that the declines we observed in
independent uses of the studied brand names are not just a
function of overall declines, and that we need to consider
other factors.
B. Surname Uses and Family Migration
As noted above, we found sixty of the 131 brand names
in our study, or about 46% of those names, in use as
surnames in the residential listings of Chicago, Manhattan,
and Philadelphia. Uses of those names as brand names,
however, accounted for about 81% of the independent
brandname uses in those three cities in 1960.120 Moreover,
the rate of decline of surname brand uses closely tracked
the overall decline in independent uses—53.73% versus
54.00%—so that the percentage of surname uses remained
stable, rising less than one half of one percent from 1960 to
2010.121 Thus, changes in independent brandname use rates
might be tied to changes in the Chicago, Manhattan, and
120. See id. (spreadsheet Surname Correl 3).
121. See id.
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Philadelphia populations of those bearing the surnames
represented in the study.
To provide a basis for testing this hypothesis, we
counted the number of residential listings for each of the
sixty surnames in the 1960 and 2010 telephone books in
each of the three cities. The aggregate results are displayed
in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Surname Listings Counts and Surname BrandName
Uses in White Pages Telephone Books122

1960
1960
Listings
of 60
Surnames

Independent
Uses of 60
Surnames
as Brand

Percentage

2010
2010
Listings
of 60
Surnames

Names

Independent
Uses of 60
Surnames
as Brand

Percentage

Change

Change

Independent

Listings of

Uses of 60

60

Surnames

Surnames

as Brand

Names

Names
39.13%

59.37%

5.08%

50.58%

209

16.39%

52.28%

1129

23.52%

53.73%

Chicago

5543

790

3374

321

Manhattan

3290

1212

3123

599

Philadelphia

3625

438

3031

TOTAL

12458

2440

9528

If we examine the totals, aggregating the figures from
all three cities, it appears as though there is a reasonably
strong correlation between the change in the number of
telephone listings of residents with one of the sixty studied
surnames and the change in number of uses of those
surnames as independent brand names. The telephone
listings of residents of the three cities with one of the sixty
surnames dropped 23.52% from 1960 to 2010, while the
number of independent brandname uses of those surnames
dropped 53.73%. Although it would be unreasonable to
think that the decrease in listings could account for the
122. The figures for the Surname Brand Uses are from spreadsheet Surname
Correl 3. Id. The figures for surname listings are summarized on spreadsheet
Surname Correl 3, and are contained in the database Brand Names table. Id.
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entire decrease in independent brandname uses—each
resident listed in the phone book could not be responsible
for two businesses—it could still account for a large portion
of the decrease.123 The reality, however, is more complex.
The three cities experienced similar decreases in
independent brandname uses of the sixty surnames,
ranging from about 50% in Manhattan to about 59% in
Chicago—a difference of only 9%. The variation in decreases
of surname listings was, however, much greater. Manhattan
lost only 5.08% of its sixtysurname listings, while
Philadelphia lost 16.39%, over three times as much, and
Chicago lost a whopping 39.13%, almost eight times as
much as Manhattan.124 Since the cities’ losses in both
categories follow the same rank order, the data still suggest
the possibility of a linear, causal relationship between loss
in population and loss in brandname use, but a much
smaller one. One would have to attribute the bulk of the
decreases—49%—to other causes, and as for the rest, it
would take a loss of about 4% in residential surname
123. The decrease in residential listings could represent a substantially larger
drop in population if the national averages for change in household size and
change in percentage of households that had wireline telephone numbers held
for all three cities. Between 1960 and 2000, the national average household size
decreased from 3.29 to 2.59, while the percentage of households with telephone
service increased from 74% in 1960 to 95% in 2007. Douglas Galbi, U.S.
Historical Telephone Statistics, AllSummary Spreadsheet, http://galbithink.org/
telcos/historicaltelephonestats.xls (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). On the other
hand, by 2007, 14.7% of U.S. households had wirelessonly telephone service. Id.
(Wireless Spreadsheet). If, as is most likely the case, those wireless numbers are
not listed in white pages telephone books, while the wireline numbers largely
are, then the percentage of households with listed numbers has remained close
to flat between 1960 and 2008. Thus, we would really only need to correct for
household size. Applying such a correction, the percentage decrease in
population of the sixty surnames in the study would be 39.79% rather than
23.52%. (We do not know whether there has been a change in the percentage of
wireline numbers that are unlisted, and if so, how large that change is.)
124. By comparison, Manhattan’s total population in 1990 was 4.08% lower
than its population in 1960; Philadelphia’s was 27.72% lower; and Chicago’s was
19.64% lower. See Campbell Gibson & Kay Jung, Historical Census Statistics on
Population Totals by Race, 1790 to 1990, and by Hispanic Origin, 1970 to 1990,
for Large Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/
twps0076.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010); Population Estimates: Incorporated
Places and Minor Civil Divisions, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU tbl.2,
http://www.census.gov/popest/cities/SUBEST2008.html (follow the second
“Excel” (54k) hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).
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listings to cause a loss of one further percent of independent
brandname uses of the surnames.125
Surname Ratio Comparisons and the Factor of Race. If
we look at the data in even more detail, we see further
complications. The ratio of residential listings to brand
name uses varies widely between surnames. With many of
the surnames, this could be a function of the very small
numbers of both resident listings and brandname uses.
However, seven of the surnames had at least 100 residential
listings in each city in both 1960 and 2010, and so might
possibly exhibit somewhat more regularity. We looked at
the residential listing to brandname use ratio for each of
those seven surnames: Baker, Campbell, Carter, Douglas,
Ford, Mack, and Rogers. In 1960, Manhattan had ratios
ranging from 5.13 residential listings to one brandname
use (Baker) to 11.06 residential listings to one brandname
use (Mack); Chicago’s range was from 6.02 to 1 (Douglas) to
28.36 to 1 (Carter); and Philadelphia’s range was from 8.78
to 1 (Baker) to 47.46 to 1 (Carter).126 Those ratios all
significantly increased by 2010, and there was some change
in the relative place of surnames as well.
We suspect that one factor that can explain much of
these disparities is the possible lower rate of business
formation by disadvantaged minority residents. The only
information currently available on the race of holders of
common surnames is from the United States Census for the
year 2000. It shows that there is a substantial variation in
the percentages of various races that hold the surnames in
our study. For example, 82.08% of people with the surname
“Baker” reported that they were white—the highest
percentage of any of the seven surnames on which we
focused. By contrast, only 60.51% of those with the surname
“Carter,” and 47.35% of those with the surname “Mack,”
reported that they were white, the two lowest percentages
from among the seven surnames.127 It is very unlikely to be
coincidence, then, that in all three cities, in both 1960 and
125. See the summary output of the regression on line 49 of spreadsheet
Surname Correl 3. Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10.
126. See id. (spreadsheet Surname Correl T7 19602010).
127. See Genealogy Data: Frequently Occurring Surnames from Census 2000,
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/data/2000
U.S.
CENSUS
surnames/index.html (follow “File A: Top 1000 Names” link) (last visited Dec.
10, 2010).
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2010, “Baker” has a substantially lower ratio of residential
listings to brandname uses than “Carter” or “Mack.” In
other words, Bakers were both more likely to be white and
more likely to be business owners than Carters or Macks.
In some cases, the ranking of residential listing/brand
name use ratios parallels the ranking of surnames by the
percentages of white holders of those names almost exactly.
One example is 1960 Manhattan data for the seven top
surnames, on which we ran regression analyses. A
regression equation that uses the number of residential
listings as the sole independent variable and number of
brandname uses as the dependent variable produces an R
Square of .5977, and a pvalue for the independent variable
of .0415. That means, roughly, that the variation in
residential listings amounts for about 59% of the variation
in brandname uses, and there is only a four percent chance
that the two variables are unrelated. If we add the 2000
Census percentages of white holders of each surname as a
second variable, the R Square climbs to .9352, accounting
for 93% of the variation in brandname uses. The pvalue for
the white holder percentages is a low .0103, but the pvalue
for the residential listing numbers climbs to .2957. In other
words, the brandname uses are actually correlated more
tightly with the racial distribution of surname use then they
are with the numbers of residents in Manhattan. 128

128. For the regression results, see Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10
(spreadsheet Surname Correl T7 19602010 at l. 38). Because some of the
surnames are also used as given names, we also looked at information about the
historical incidence of baby names, gathered from social security records. For
example, in a sample of 656,685 social security records between 1920 and 1929,
there were no children named “Baker” or “Campbell,” but there were fortythree
boys named “Ford,” fifty named “Carter,” 310 named “Mack,” 941 named
“Douglas,” and sixtytwo named “Rogers.” See Douglas Galbi, Most Popular
Given Names: US, 18011999, GALBI THINK!.COM, http://www.galbithink.org/
names/us200.htm (follow 19201929 Social Security samples “names” hyperlink
in Popular Given Names US, Males) (last visited Dec. 11, 2010). We chose the
decade 19201929 because we figured that business owners in 1960 would have
been given their first names, on average, several decades earlier. However, this
variable did not do well as an addition to the regression equation; it increased
the R Square by less than two onehundredths of one percent, and had a pvalue
of .7837. See Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (spreadsheet Surname Correl T7
19602010 at l. 38). In other words, it seems that very few people were naming
businesses after their given names.
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The correlations are not quite as close with other years
and cities, but it is also likely that the racial distributions of
the surnames in the study are not nationally uniform or
uniform across time, and so they may diverge substantially
from the 2000 Census figures that are available. In the
absence of more local information, we cannot come to more
precise conclusions about the influence of race, but we have
good reason to suspect that it is a substantial factor.
In sum, family migration has likely played some role in
the decline of rates of brandname sharing of the sixty
brand names in our study that are also family names, and
since uses of those brand names represent over 80% of all
uses in our study, they have an impact on overall figures as
well. However, given the wide difference between losses of
the sixtysurname population in the three cities, and the
much smaller difference in losses of uses of those names as
brand names, it appears that the family migration can only
account for somewhere between two and twelve percent of
the brand name losses, which still leaves a large portion
that must be attributed to other factors.
C. Variable Attractiveness of Brand Names Over Time
Advocates of broad protection for trademarks assert
that second comers are attracted to successful marks and
wish to appropriate the luster of the mark in order to
increase business.129 If this were true, then one would expect

129. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203 (1942).
The protection of trademarks is the law’s recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it
is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trademark is a
merchandising shortcut which induces a purchaser to select what he
wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a
mark exploits this human propensity by making every effort to
impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a
congenial symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the
same—to convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears.
Once this is attained, the trademark owner has something of value. If
another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol he has
created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
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to see a correlation between the popularity of a brand and
the number of subsequent independent users of the brand
name. In other words, “Cadillac,” a more successful brand
prior to the Japanese auto invasion, should have been a less
attractive target for appropriation in the 2000s.130 One
would expect to see a decline in independent uses over a
time period that correlated with the brand’s decline in
popularity. In fact, of the ninetysix total independent uses
of “Cadillac” after 1960, fortyseven occurred in 1980,
twentysix in 1990, sixteen in 2000, and only seven in
2010.131
In several graphs below, we attempt to estimate the
variation in popularity of thirtyseven of our 131 brands by
tracking how often the brand name is mentioned yearly in
the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and the

Id. at 205. The House report on proposed antidilution legislation states that the
new cause of action would “recognize[ ] the substantial investment the owner
has made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself,
protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own gain.”
H.R. REP. No. 104374 at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030;
see also Blake R. Bertagna, Poaching Profits: An Examination of The Ability of a
Trademark Owner to Recover an Infringer’s Profits Under the Lanham Act as
Amended in 1999, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 257, 292 (2008) (“[I]t is ‘famous
marks’ that are the ideal target for cybersquatters and ‘freeriders’ since ‘famous
marks . . . are more likely to be remembered and associated in the public mind’
and are thus more attractive as targets for wouldbe copyists.”) (alteration in
original) (quoting Recot, Inc. v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2000));
Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don’t I Know You From Somewhere? Protection in the
United States of Foreign Trademarks that are Well Known But Not Used There,
98 TRADEMARK REP. 1379, 1415 (2008) (“Famous marks are particularly
attractive to free riders . . . seeking to capitalize on the financial investment of
the mark owner. Copying a famous mark, the Federal Circuit recognizes, gives
free riders immediate recognition and substantiallyreduced advertising costs.”).
130. Cadillac sales plummeted in the last twentyfive years. As a percentage of
the total US car market, Cadillac sales constituted only 1.2% in 2008. See
WARD’S AUTO. GRP., WARD’S 2009 AUTOMOTIVE YEARBOOK 251 (71st ed. 2009).
Percentage in prior years include: 2003 (1.3%), 1998 (2.2%), 1993 (2.4%), 1987
(3.7%), 1982 (4.3%), 1977 (4.0%), and 1972 (3.1%). See WARD’S AUTO. GRP.,
WARD’S AUTOMOTIVE YEARBOOK 242 (66th ed. 2004), 250 (61st ed. 1999), 204
(56th ed. 1994), 156 (50th ed. 1988), 70 (45th ed. 1983), 70 (45th ed. 1983), 71
(45th ed. 1983) (respectively).
131. See Brauneis
TotalAlphaByYear).
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Washington Post at regular intervals from 19602005.132 The
list of brands comes from an upcoming study of trademark
dilution, measuring independent uses of brand names in
nontelephone databases, including newspapers, state
corporate/LLC name databases, and trademark registers.
For that study we selected thirtyseven of the 131 marks
that seemed most entitled to protection from trademark
dilution. We dropped common surnames like Baker,
Campbell, Carter, and Douglas, and omitted common word
names like Royal, Metropolitan, Eagle, and Diamond, to
focus on those marks that we thought courts would be most
likely to protect from independent uses.133 In other words,
we chose a list of marks that should have benefited most
clearly from the legal changes that we chronicle in Part I of
this Article. The marks are:
Bacardi

Green Giant

Packard

Budweiser

Guinness

Palmolive

Buick

HarleyDavidson

Perrier

Bulova

Harvard

Rolex

Cadillac

IBM

Sanka

Chanel

Jack Daniels

Schlitz

Clorox

Jello

Sherwin Williams

CocaCola

Kodak

Steinway

Corvette

Louisville Slugger

RollsRoyce

Dr. Pepper

Mazda

Tampax

Ex Lax

MercedesBenz

Uneeda

Fatima

Oreo

Windex
Zippo

First, we should note that our subset of thirtyseven
marks followed the same general decline in independent
132. See ProQuest Historical Newspapers, PROQUEST, http://www.proquest.com
/enUS/catalogs/databases/detail/pqhistnews.shtml (last visited Nov. 17, 2010).
133. Because of the “substantial exclusivity” factor, owners of marks like
Baker, Campbell, Carter, Douglas, Royal, Metropolitan, Eagle, and Diamond
have had little luck asserting rights under state or federal dilution statutes. See
MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 24.67.
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uses as the full set of 131 marks, although the decline starts
in 1980 instead of 1960.
FIGURE 2

This decline in independent uses is driven strongly by
three brands: “Cadillac,” “Packard,” and “Uneeda.” The
graph below isolated those three brands. We also include
“Harvard” as the next most frequently adopted mark subject
to substantial sharing during this period.
FIGURE 3
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In order to determine whether the thirtyseven famous
marks also suffered a decline in popularity during the same
fiftyyear period, we tracked each mark for oneyear
periods, four times per decade, from 1960 to 2005 in the
New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post,
e.g. in 1960, 1963, 1965, 1968. We counted the number of
brand names mentioned as an approximate measure of the
extent to which the brand was in the public consciousness in
a particular year. Prominence in major newspapers is
obviously a very rough proxy for brand popularity, but we
note that courts and brand owners have long counted
“consumer impressions” as a measure of brand
consciousness134 and even as a way to measure secondary
meaning (mark strength) in trademark litigation.135
Advertising theory in general discounts the content of
advertisements and takes more seriously the number of
times consumers encounter a brand name in any context.136
In other words, the number of times a brand is mentioned in
a national newspaper (“newspaper hits”) may provide fairly
relevant information about brand/consumer associations
and therefore the attractiveness of the brand to
appropriators.
We counted a large number of newspaper hits for the
thirtyseven marks, peaking with 42,582 hits in 1970 and
43,758 hits in 1985. In raw numbers, there is a very
significant decline, down to 8,078 hits in the year 2005, with
barely more than 10,000 hits in 2000 and 1995, but these
134. See Graeme W. Austin, Tolerating Confusion about
Trademark Policies and Fair Use, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 157 (2008).

Confusion:

[A]ccurate assessment of the strength of the mark in any dispute would
be difficult without some reference to consumers’ impressions.
Assessing the strength of a mark necessarily involves some kind of
inquiry into how consumers respond to the messages about the
trademark that its proprietor has conveyed, mostly through branding
and promotion. Similarly, a firm achieves sufficient “fame” for the
purposes of dilution doctrine when the trademark has sufficiently
penetrated consumers’ consciousness. Proxies are sometimes used in
the course of this inquiry: courts might focus on how long the mark has
been used in a particular marketing sector, or how many promotion and
advertising dollars have been spent on it.
Id. at 167.
135. See MCCARTHY, supra note 55, § 15:50.
136. See generally EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (5th ed. 1998).
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figures do not account for change in the size of the
newspapers from year to year, nor for the fact that after a
certain point Wall Street Journal (1992) and Washington
Post (1993) data are unavailable in the ProQuest Historical
Newspapers database. So, after 1993, we only measure hits
in the New York Times.
In order to account for changes in the contents of the
newspaper database—a problem because fewer pages
scanned means less data and presumably fewer hits—we
used the five most common words in the English language
as a baseline for the years studied. We tracked the words
“the,” “of,” “a,” “in,” and “to” (together “most common
words”) in the same way we tracked the thirtyseven brand
names. If the newspaper database remained the same size,
the number of hits for these common words should not have
varied much from year to year. Therefore, any change we
saw in the number of common words should have been the
result of a change in the size of the database due to the
variable size of newspapers or due to the post1992 absence
of the Wall Street Journal and post1993 absence of the
Washington Post. What we see, for example, is that in 1990
the most common words were mentioned 1,937,000 times in
the three newspaper databases, but in 1993, the number
drops to 1,352,890 and then to 583,000 in 1995. By
comparing changes in the frequency of hits on the most
common words with the frequency of hits on our thirty
seven brand names, we are able to provide an accurate
picture of real changes in mentions of the brands. In other
words, we charted a real decline in brand names only if
their rate of decline was greater than the rate of decline of
the five most common words over the same period of time.
Figure 4 below presents the number of brand name hits
as a proportion of the number of fivemostcommonword
hits. We list the real trend for our thirtyseven marks as the
line labeled, “strong brand.” We also chart hits on four of
the most common brand names from our entire list of 131
marks. The line labeled, “common brand,” charts the
frequency with which Diamond, Eagle, Metropolitan, and
Royal are mentioned in relation to the five most common
English words. Since those four marks were representative
of those omitted, we were curious to see if they behaved any
differently from the more exclusively controlled thirtyseven
famous brands.
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FIGURE 4
Brand Names in Proportion to the Five Most Common
Words (Unadjusted)

The graph seems to show the prominence of the brands
rising from 1960, peaking from 198095 and then declining
sharply to 2005. We grew to doubt, however, whether the
data told a reliable story about brand popularity, because
the initial data used above included mentions of the brand
names in classified advertising. We decided that we should
rerun the numbers without the classified advertising hits
for several reasons. First, many of our most frequently
mentioned brands were associated with goods that could be
resold,137 and a very high percentage of yearly “hits,”
sometimes as much as 50%, came from ads in the classified
sections of the New York Times and Washington Post. When
a brand is mentioned in the classified ads, it does not make
an impression on a substantial number of consumers, as
opposed to a large print ad or a story. Second, an
appearance in the classifieds may suggest a loss in brand
luster. For example, those seeking to sell their Cadillacs
may be dissatisfied with them or looking to finance the
purchase of a new Honda. The appearance of some brands
137. Including “Buick,” “Bulova,” “Cadillac,” “IBM,” “Kodak,” “Mazda,”
“MercedesBenz,” “Packard,” “Rolex,” “RollsRoyce,” and “Steinway.”
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in the classifieds may also be a measure of hard economic
times. In some years, “IBM” and “Steinway” are mentioned
frequently in the classifieds as sellers try to raise needed
cash. Third, the Wall Street Journal does not have nearly as
many pages of classified “for sale” ads as the other two
papers, so when it drops out of the database in 1993, the
results becomes skewed. Fourth, and most importantly,
after the mid1990s the number of hits in classified ads
plummets to a tiny fraction of previous levels. In 1993, for
example, there were 1970 classified ads for Cadillacs, but
only sixtynine in 2005. As people begin to advertise used
goods online instead of in newspapers, the loss of ads
generates an artificial downtick in brand prominence if one
includes classifieds in the hit count.
If one omits classified ads from the adjusted hit count
below, the graph changes looks quite different:
FIGURE 5

The trend for both lines since 1960 is generally up, and
significantly so. In other words, in proportion to the five
most commonly used words, the thirtyseven brands we
tracked appeared more frequently in newspapers over the

196

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

course of the fiftyyear period during which we saw a
decline in independent use. Thus, for example, if we
imagine that a reader of a daily newspaper spent about the
same time reading the paper every day over that period,
and therefore read about the same number of words per
newspaper issue, she would encounter more mentions of the
thirtyseven brands in 2005 than in 1960.
Of course, if the daily newspaper reader read the paper
covertocover every day over those fortyfive years, she
would encounter fewer mentions in 2005 than in 1960. The
raw number of mentions of the thirtyseven brands
decreased over the fiftyyear period, although not at nearly
as high at rate as the total volume of text in the
newspapers, as measured by the samples of the five most
commonly used words. Yet, it is at least plausible that the
average newspaper reader, during her incomplete perusal of
the daily paper, was exposed in 2005 to a number of
mentions of our thirtyseven brands that equaled or
exceeded the number to which she was exposed in 1960. If
that is the case, then we have found no support for the
theory that diminishing popularity drove the decline in
brand sharing that we documented in the first part of the
article. In fact, the newspaper data may provide some
indirect support for the notion that increased protection for
trademarks after 1960 drove the decline in brand sharing.
The same increased protection may have given brand
owners the confidence to advertise more extensively and
promote their products to the public. The proportional
increase in brandname mentions may be the result of
investment spurred by an ever friendlier legal environment
for owners of famous marks.
Finally, we wanted to ask one more question about
“Cadillac,” an important mark that saw a sharp decline in
the number of independent uses from 19602010. We
wondered whether GM might have propped up the mark
through advertising to counter worries about dropping
popularity as foreign cars begin to dominate the market. In
other words, we wondered what would happen to “Cadillac”
hits if we omitted both commercial print and classified ads.
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FIGURE 6

We feel strongly that it is proper to include commercial
ads paid for by the brand owner in the newspaper hit count
statistics. After all, a consumer impression is made by a
large print advertisement as well as by an unsolicited story.
It would seem odd to measure brand prominence and brand
value without counting the influence of advertising on
consumers. Nonetheless, because we assumed that
“Cadillac” was a dying (or at least ailing) brand, we were
surprised to see that its proportional increase in mentions
was not driven by its own advertising expenditures. It also
appears more frequently over time in regular news stories.
D. Structural Changes in the Popularity of Business Name
Types
Because we chose to focus mostly on brand names that
have been in use for a century or more, many of our brand
names reflect naming patterns that were prevalent long
ago, but may no longer be prevalent. In an era when
personal savings often provided the startup capital for a
business and family members provided labor, it was quite
natural to use the family name as the name of the business.
When startup capital for a business is provided by outside
investors who may not want to tie the identity of the
business too closely to the founder, and when family
members no longer dominate the business’s labor force, the
business may be less likely to take on a family name. Thus,
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for example, a study of the top 100 global brands in 2005
showed that, of the seventy brands that had originated
before 1945, forty of them were the family name of the
founder, whereas of the thirty brands that had originated
after 1945, only three were the family name of the
founder.138 If the same trend were reflected in the telephone
books we studied, much of the decline in brandname
sharing rates that we have observed might be the result of
shifts from family names to other names rather than overall
declines in sharing rates, and perhaps there are other brand
names we have not included that have become popular more
recently. One might imagine, for example, the emergence of
brand names related to jets, rockets and atoms in the post
World War II era or brand names related to ecology and
“greenness” in the postEarth Day era. We suspect that the
trend away from family names is less pronounced among
the small businesses that dominate white pages telephone
listings. To understand whether this is true, however, we
would have to count uses of a much larger number of brand
names, which is a very laborintensive project, and
therefore cannot be pursued within the scope of this Article.
This factor, then, remains a topic for further research.
E. Personalization and the Flattening of Name Popularity
Douglas Galbi has documented a significant trend
towards less concentrated distribution of personal given
names over the last two centuries, after many centuries of
essentially unchanged distribution.139 For example, 21.5% of
the males born in 1800 in England and Wales were given
the name John, making it the most popular name in that
year; in that year, the top ten given names for males

138. See Allan K.K. Chan et al., Chinese Brand Names and Global Brand
Names: Implications from Two Corpus Analyses, in Conference Report,
Proceedings of the Tenth International Business Research Conference 17 (Zia
Haqq ed., Apr. 1617, 2009), http://www.wbiconpro.com/13%5B1%5D.%20Allan
HK.pdf.
139. See Douglas A. Galbi, A New Account of Personalization and Effective
Communication, GALBI THINK!.COM (Sept. 16, 2001), http://www.galbithink.
org/pers.htm [hereinafter Galbi, A New Account]; Douglas A. Galbi, Long Term
Trends in Personal Given Name Frequencies in the UK, GALBI THINK!.COM (July
20, 2002), http://www.galbithink.org/names.htm.
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accounted for 84.7% of the boys born in that year.140 Samples
of given names over the previous 500 years showed very
similar concentrations. Yet since 1800, the percentages of
the population given the most popular and the ten most
popular names have both declined steadily. By 1994, the
most popular given name for males, James, was given to
only 4.2% of the boys born in that year, and the top ten
names accounted for only 28.4% of the males born in that
year.141 Galbi describes this phenomenon in terms of an
increased preference for personalization and a decline of
shared symbolic experience. Since the choice of a given
name was unfettered by legal constraints throughout this
period, the reduced concentration of names cannot be
explained as a function of legal change, but must stem from
cultural factors.
Cultural forces at work in realigning the distribution of
given names could also manifest themselves in business
naming patterns. In that case, assuming that the stock of
business names could itself be increased, as it can by
coining previously nonexistent words, rates of brandname
sharing might decrease across the board quite
independently of legal influences. Indeed, the new legal
rules that limit brandname sharing might not have been
adopted if judges and legislators were not culturally
comfortable with naming diversity and the phenomenon of
newly coined names.
As we will detail in Part VII below, in our sample of 131
brand names, the distribution of brand names has actually
become more concentrated. Although sharing rates for those
names have declined broadly, they have declined less
significantly for the names that started out with higher
rates of sharing. Thus our sample, over the time period we
studied, does not exhibit the decreased concentration that
Galbi observes. A more comprehensive study of business
naming concentration would require data about the total
number of business names in use by businesses in a
jurisdiction over time, and that is beyond the scope of this
study.

140. See Galbi, A New Account, supra note 139, at tbl.3 (“Most Popular Names
in England/Wales”).
141. See id.
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V. ANTIDILUTION AND INFRINGEMENT LAWS AS CAUSES OF
THE DECLINE IN INDEPENDENT USES OF FAMOUS BRAND
NAMES
We have noted that there has been a significant decline
in the rate of independent uses of the 131 famous brand
names tracked in this study. We have further noted that
that decline does not seem to be entirely accounted for by
the decline in the total number of brand name uses listed in
the telephone books we studied, nor by the decline in
residents who have as surnames the famous brand names
we have chosen to study. Thus, increased trademark law
protection could well play a role in the decline, but what
sort of correlation might provide evidence that legal changes
have in fact played a role? We will consider two possibilities:
1) correlation of declines in uses with the timing of legal
changes; and 2) correlation of the percentage decline in
independent uses of each brand name with the initial
number of independent uses. We will conclude that the first
approach is not promising, but that the second approach is.
A. Correlating the Timing of Declines with the Dates of
Legal Changes
We know the precise dates that trademark dilution
legislation became effective. The FTDA became effective on
January 16, 1996.142 The states of Illinois and New York
first enacted antidilution legislation in the mid1950s:
Illinois in 1953,143 and New York in 1955.144 Pennsylvania
first enacted antidilution legislation in 1984.145 Shifts in
judicial approaches to trademark infringement are more
difficult to pinpoint, but one can try to identify key
decisions. Gerard Magliocca, for example, argues that Judge
Henry Friendly’s opinion in the 1961 case of Polaroid Corp.
142. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 10498, § 5, 109
Stat. 985, 987 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006)).
143. See Act of June 24, 1955, § 1, 1953 Ill. Laws 455 (codified as amended at
765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1036/65 (West 2010)).
144. See Act of Apr. 18, 1955, ch. 453, § 1, 1955 N.Y. Laws 466 (codified as
amended at N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368d) (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2010)).
145. See Act of Dec. 16, 1982, ch. 12, § 1124, 1982 Pa. Laws 1329 (codified as
amended at 54 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1996 & Supp. 2010)).
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v. Polarad Electronics Corp.146 was pivotal in resolving a
dispute in the Second Circuit in favor of broader
infringement protection.147
A search for sudden changes in brandname sharing
rates immediately after these dates, however, will end in
disappointment. When averaged across all three cities in
the study, brandname sharing rates have dropped steadily
for the last fifty years, at rates of between fifteen and
twenty percent each decade between 1960 and 2010.148
Although the rate of decline is slightly higher between 1990
and 2000—the decade that federal dilution legislation was
passed—there are no obvious sudden movements.
Yet the lack of sudden changes should not be taken as
proof that increased trademark protection has had little or
no effect. Rather, it seems likely that due to reluctance to
apply new rules retroactively and the resultant persistence
of established independent uses, legislation and shifts in
judicial attitude will only have a gradual effect on brand
name sharing rates. As for legislation, some courts have
explicitly ruled that the FTDA cannot be applied to
trademark uses that began before its effective date.149
Others have decided that injunctive relief may be available
against such uses, but like all injunctive relief, “subject to
the principles of equity,” which would counsel against relief
against uses that commenced a substantial time before
enactment of the statute.150 Under either approach, relief

146. 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
147. See Magliocca, supra note 26, at 1005.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 10915.
149. See, e.g., S Indus., Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 991 F. Supp.
1012, 1021 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat’l Dev.
Corp., 973 F. Supp. 552, 55460 (M.D.N.C. 1997); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Officemax, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 409, 41518 (E.D. Va. 1996).
150. See Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 892 (8th Cir. 1998).
One court has also held that a plaintiff’s federal dilution claim, made thirty
years after defendant’s commencement of use and eighteen years after plaintiff
should have known of that use, was barred by laches, when there had been a
federal dilution claim available for ten years and a state claim for more than
thirty years. See Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 1096,
111013, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2008); MCCARTHY, supra note 33, § 24:130 (arguing
that a defense of laches should be available against a federal dilution claim even
if legislation has just made the federal claim available, so long as a
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under federal dilution law is unlikely to be available against
established uses.
Courts do not usually explicitly declare their own
doctrinal shifts to be prospective only, but they can and do
use doctrines of laches and acquiescence to limit the
retroactive effect of expanded protection. The case of
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.,151 which Gerard
Magliocca argues ushered in an era of broader infringement
protection,152 provides a good example. Although the court
recognized that infringement protection might be extended
to more distantly related goods, it held that plaintiff
Polaroid Corporation’s claim was barred by laches.153 The
court rejected Polaroid’s argument that a laches bar would
only arise if Polaroid engaged in affirmative conduct
sanctioning Polarad’s use, and concluded that an eleven
year delay in taking legal action was sufficient, so long as
Polarad was not making directly competing goods, but
merely related goods.154 The decision thus expands the
definition of related goods, but limits significantly the
retroactive effect of the expansion.
If both legislation and judicial decisions have limited
retroactive effect, then a key factor in the timing of the
effect of legal changes is the rate of turnover of brandname
uses: how frequently do older uses cease as businesses are
dissolved, and how frequently do new uses arise as new
businesses are created? Because our database includes a
field containing each full business name, we were able to
analyze rates of turnover of brandname uses.155 Table 3

substantially equivalent state dilution claim had been available but was not
used by plaintiff).
151. 287 F.2d 492.
152. See Magliocca, supra note 26, at 1005.
153. 287 F.2d at 498.
154. Id. at 497.
155. This required a great deal of proofreading and editing to ensure that the
representations of a business name remained identical in different years. For
example, we had to account for differing abbreviations, such as “Co” and “Corp”
for “Corporation,” or “Eng” and “Engrg” for “Engineering,” and for the presence
and absence of “Inc” (a business might be listed as “Crest Roofing Co” in one
year, and “Crest Roofing Co Inc” in another).
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summarizes rates of turnover of brandname uses in all
three cities in the study.
TABLE 3
Rates of Turnover of Independent BrandName Uses in
Chicago, Manhattan, and Philadelphia, 19402010

1940 to 1960
1960 and before to
1980
1980 and before to
1990
1990 and before to
2000
2000 and before to
2010

All 131

Consistently

Brand

Famous Names (in

Names in

Hotchkiss and

the Study

Golder)

73.15%

66.17%

64.83%

67.35%

66.78%

67.21%

64.16%

58.29%

59.95%

59.96%

57.33%

66.72%

50.46%

48.64%

48.01%

51.39%

38.31%

34.00%

33.23%

36.61%

Top 8 Consistently
Famous Names (in
initial uses)

Consistently
Famous Names
(between 11 and
20 initial uses)

The figure in each box represents the percentage of
independent brandname uses that were found in the
ending year of the period listed in the lefthand column, but
not in the beginning year or in a previous period. Thus, for
example, taking the far upper lefthand data cell, for all 131
brand names that we covered in the study, 73.15% of the
brandname uses that appeared in the 1960 telephone books
had not appeared in the 1940 telephone books. It is not
surprising that the highest turnover rate is found between
1940 and 1960, for as the reader will recall, the total
number of independent uses of the 131 brand names
increased substantially during this period—from 2,293 to
3,000, an increase of 31% (though the turnover rate is still
substantially higher than that increase). Turnover rates for
all 131 brand names then decrease for all subsequent
periods. The first two periods, of course, are twice as long as
the last three. By 2010, only 38.31% of independent uses of
the 131 brand names did not appear in 2000 or before.
These turnover rates suggest that the effects of prospective
legal changes would be delayed, but certainly not
indefinitely: a prospective ban introduced in 2000 would
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have affected 38.31% of independent brandname uses by
2010. The turnover rates do suggest, however, that
prospective legal changes will not result in immediate
declines and make it more difficult to trace a specific portion
of the decline in brandname sharing to legal changes.
The second, third and fourth columns in Table 3
calculate turnover rates for specific subsets of the 131 brand
names. The second column considers turnover rates for the
fortyfive brand names that were leaders in their product
areas in both the Hotchkiss and Golder studies, and
therefore by one measure can be considered consistently
famous. During all periods other than 1960 to 1980 these
rates are somewhat lower. One conceivable explanation for
the lower rates is that infringement and dilution protection
of these brand names is hindering the appearance of new
independent uses; but the rates are not dramatically lower,
and indicate that many new uses of these names appeared
as well. We will discuss the third and fourth columns of
Figure 8 below.
B. Correlating Percentage Declines with Initial Numbers of
Independent Uses
Our second attempt to assess the impact of legal
changes on brandname sharing rates takes advantage of
the prominence of thirdparty use of a brand name as a
factor in assessing both infringement and dilution liability.
As we discussed above in Part I, consideration of that factor
is mandated by the TDRA, which directs courts to consider
“[t]he extent to which the owner of the famous mark is
engaged in substantially exclusive use of the mark;”156 it is
also an important factor in state dilution law, and in state
and federal infringement law.
Because of the weight accorded the factor of
“substantially exclusive use,” it is almost certain that many
of the brand names we studied, although “famous” in the
sense that they are widely recognized by the general
consuming public in the United States, would receive
limited dilution protection. Some, indeed, would almost
certainly receive no dilution protection at all. Although the
156. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109312,
§2(c)(2)(B)(iii), 120 Stat. 1730, 1731 (2006) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)).
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TDRA treats the extent of thirdparty use as one factor to be
balanced with others, many courts and commentators have
concluded that if thirdparty use rises above a certain level,
protection
against
dilution
becomes
completely
unavailable.157 If we knew exactly which brand names courts
would refuse to protect on grounds of insufficiently
exclusive use, we could use the rate of decline of
independent uses of those brand names as a baseline.158
Against that baseline, we would compare the rate of decline
of independent uses of brand names that met the criterion
of substantially exclusive use. If the rate of decline of the
independent uses of those qualifying brand names was
greater than the baseline rate, that would be evidence that
the passage of dilution laws had had an effect.
Unfortunately, we do not know exactly which brand
names would be denied protection due to thirdparty uses.
No court has formulated a brightline rule about how many
independent uses would result in the denial of protection,
and a simple count of uses would in any event not suffice,
since uses by small, local businesses would surely not count
against exclusivity as much as highvolume uses on a
national scale.159 Moreover, trademark infringement
analysis also takes into account the extent of thirdparty
uses in determining the scope of protection, and many have
argued that infringement protection has expanded during
the same period that dilution protection was introduced,
particularly for those marks that are famous enough to
qualify for protection against dilution.160 Isolating the effect
of new antidilution statutes is therefore difficult.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 3945.
158. We make a guess with the thirtyseven brands we graph in Figure 2.
159. One formulation of a test to determine whether thirdparty uses would
affect dilution protection was articulated by Anne Gundelfinger, testifying as
the President of the International Trademark Association during a hearing on
the TDRA. As she put it, the question is whether those uses “have . . . visibility
to the average consumer.” Trademark Dilution: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter Testimony] (testimony of Anne
Gundelfinger, President, Int’l Trademark Assoc.) (“[W]here other similar marks
are already in wide use and have been over a lengthy period of time, it may be
less likely that the junior use will have the effect of blurring the famous mark,
unless those uses have little or no visibility to the average consumer.”).
160. See Beebe, supra note 56, at 463.
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If, however, we limit our aspirations to determining if
we can see some impact of legal change in general, without
attempting to separate out the effects of antidilution
statutes from those of increased infringement protection, it
should be possible to formulate a testable hypothesis that
takes into account the factor of thirdparty uses, even
without knowing exactly the number and size of such uses
that courts would find precluded dilution protection. If
increased legal protection has caused a reduction in
independent uses, then the proportionate decline in
independent uses should be greater with respect to those
brand names that had fewer independent uses to begin with.
With this hypothesis in mind, we attempted to compare
rates of decline of independent uses among brand names
that started out with a higher number of independent uses
to rates of decline among brand names that started out with
a lower number of such uses. We focused in particular on
those fortyfive brand names that appeared in both the
Hotchkiss and Golder studies, since the owners of those
continuously famous names would have been in a position
to take advantage of antidilution protection, though we also
looked at changes in independent use rates among all 131
brand names.
Of the fortyfive continuously famous brand names,
thirtyseven had at least one independent use in 1960.161 (Of
the other eight consistently famous brand names that had
no independent uses in 1960, seven had no independent
uses in 2010 either; the sole exception, “LifeSavers,” had
one independent use.)162 In the aggregate, the thirtysix
brand names had 1291 independent uses in 1960; in 2010,
they had 535 independent uses, a decrease of 58.56%.163 The
results of our comparison of the thirtysix brand names are
displayed in Figures 7 and 8. Both Figures arrange the
brand names in order of the number of independent uses
that they had in 1960, starting with the highest number on
the left.

161. See Brauneis & Heald, supra note 10 (spreadsheet InHInG 19602010).
162. See id.
163. See id.
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FIGURE 7
Independent Uses of Consistently Famous Marks in Chicago,
Manhattan, and Philadelphia, 1960 & 2010164

Figure 7 shows that, of all of the consistently famous
brand names that had at least one independent use in 1960,
only one, “Tiffany,” actually experienced an increase in
independent uses, and only two, “Lipton” and “Gold Medal,”
had roughly equal numbers of independent uses in both
years. All other brand names experienced substantial
decreases in independent uses.
It is difficult to visually compare rates of change in
independent uses in Figure 7, but Figure 8 shows these
somewhat more clearly. Figure 8 displays three lines. The
blue line traces the percentage change in independent uses
of each brand name in the same order as Figure 7. It shows
that the two brand names with the highest number of
independent uses in 1960 did indeed exhibit lowerthan
average rates of decline: independent uses of Metropolitan
declined by only about 38%, while independent uses of
“Eagle” declined by about 49%. From there on, the line
becomes a bit more erratic, as rates of change of individual
brand names vary up and down, and that fluctuation
164. See id.
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increases as we reach brand names with very few initial
uses in 1960, with the result that one fewer or greater use
in 2010 can have a large percentage effect. The line leaves
the figure area when it reaches “Tiffany,” because that
brand name experienced a 217% increase in independent
uses between 1960 and 2010, from six to nineteen. Finally,
the line is flat at a 100% decline for the last four brand
names because those names had either one or two uses in
1960 and no uses in 2010.
FIGURE 8
Percentage Changes in Rates of Independent Use of Thirty
Six Consistently Famous Marks in Chicago, Manhattan, and
Philadelphia, 19602010

The other two lines attempt to smooth out that
individual variation. The red line displays a fivename
moving average; its position at each brand name is the
result of averaging the rate of decline of that brand name
and the two brand names to its left and to its right. That
line demonstrates a small but fairly steady increase in rates
of decline through about nineteen of the thirtysix brand
names. By the time we reach the twentieth brand name,
Heinz, we are down to thirteen independent uses in 1960, a
very steep drop from the 312 independent uses in 1960 of
Metropolitan. The fivename moving average line then
starts to climb, because a few of the brand names that had
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between six and ten independent uses in 1960 declined
significantly less, and in one case, the number of
independent uses actually increased. It then falls at the end
due to the last four dropping from one or two uses to zero.
Finally, the green line displays the cumulative average
percentage change for all brand names to the left of each
point on the line. It also reveals a steady increase in
percentage declines through about the nineteenth brand
name, followed by a gradual decrease until the final
increase for the last four names.
This pattern of declines is consistent with our
hypothesis that trademark law will have a greater effect on
sharing rates of those famous brand names that began with
a small enough number of independent uses that the owners
could claim to be engaged in “substantially exclusive use” of
their trademarks. The two brand names that began with
over 200 independent uses experienced, on average, declines
of 43%; the top eight brands, all of which began with more
than forty independent uses, experienced average declines
of 63%; and those fifteen brands that began with from ten to
twentyone independent uses experienced average declines
of 73%. If we decided that the factor of “substantially
exclusive use” would moderately weigh against those brand
names with more than forty independent uses, whereas it
would weigh substantially less against those brand names
with less than twentytwo independent uses, we would
conclude that changes in trademark protection account for
at least 10% of the decline in independent uses of brand
names. One might argue that twentytwo independent uses
are far too many for a trademark owner to claim to be
engaged in substantially exclusive use. Recall, however,
that most of the uses found in telephone books are uses on a
very small scale—singlelocation grocery stores, cleaning
services, and the like—the markets of which are confined to
particular cities or even particular neighborhoods of those
cities. It is likely that a court could find that a substantial
number of such uses “have little or no visibility to the
average consumer,”165 given that the “average consumer” in

165. See Testimony, supra note 159 (testimony of Anne Gundelfinger on the
interpretation of “substaintially exclusive use”).
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question must be constructed from consumers spread across
the entire country.166
To obtain a different perspective on this data, we also
ran a few regressions. First, we looked at the twentyone
consistently famous brand names that had at least a dozen
independent uses in 1960, excluding those with a smaller
number of initial independent uses on the theory that the
sample size of those names was too small. We set the
number of independent uses in 1960 as the independent
variable and the percentage decline of those uses from 1960
to 2010 as the dependent variable. The result was an R
Square of 0.458583 and a pvalue of 0.00074, suggesting a
very high probability that the initial number of uses
accounted for roughly 45% of the percentage decline. We
then ran the same regression on the brand names that were
not consistently famous—those that appeared in the 1921
Hotchkiss study but not in the 1997 Golder study. Thirteen
of those brand names had at least twelve independent uses.
Once again setting the number of initial uses as the
independent variable and the percentage decline as the
dependent variable, we obtained an R Square of 0.073231
and a pvalue of 0.371191. Thus, there was a much weaker
relationship between number of initial uses and percentage
decline among those brand names that had lost their fame
some time in between 1921 and 1997. This, we think, is
consistent with the hypothesis that legal change played
some role in the decrease in independent uses. If the once
famous use of a brand name lost wide recognition or ceased
altogether, it is less likely that any user would be in a
position to claim broad infringement protection or dilution
protection, and hence the initial number of independent
uses would have little impact on the rate of decline over
166. One example of such a finding can be found in Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal
International, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1820 (BNA) (E.D. Cal. 2007). In that case, the
defendant Nikepal argued that Nike, Inc. was not engaged in substantially
exclusive use of the mark “Nike” because another company, Nike Hydraulics,
Inc., had been continuously using the mark for 50 years and had held a federal
registration for it since 1958. Id. at 1827. The court rejected that argument,
noting that defendant’s witness had himself not been personally familiar with
Nike Hydraulics, Inc. before commencement of the litigation. Id. Most of the
uses in white pages telephone books are not the subject of a federal registration
and are on a far smaller scale than Nike Hydraulics, Inc.; Nikepal did not even
attempt to look for uses on that scale, but confined itself to a search of the
federal register.
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time, which is what the second regression seems to show.
Only if a famous use was consistent would that user
otherwise be in a position to claim broad infringement or
dilution protection, thus making the degree of “substantial
exclusive use” relevant to whether that protection could be
obtained. Our first regression seems to demonstrate that
relevance.
Of course, it is possible that there are explanations of
the higher decreases among lowinitialindependentuse
brand names that have nothing to do with the increase in
infringement protection and the introduction of dilution
protection. Even if the decline in independent uses we
document is driven by changes in the legal landscape, the
evidence of a legal effect is only moderately strong, in part
because the turnover rates for independent uses of
consistently famous brand names with eleven to twenty
initial uses are not dramatically lower than those for the
eight consistently famous brand names with over forty
initial uses. As Table 3 shows, the turnover rates of the
brand names with a smaller number of initial independent
uses are actually higher during all periods but one. One
interpretation of this could be that legal protection does not
deter independent users from initial use, but does then
eventually lead to discontinuance of some of those uses,
resulting in a higher turnover rate. We do not, however,
have any evidence that this is the correct interpretation.
It is worth mentioning that because thirdparty use is
important in both infringement and dilution analysis, law
can work to magnify the effect of the nonlegal factors that
are reducing brandname sharing. In 1960, some brand
names may have been shared by too many users to support
a claim by the most famous of those users that it was
engaging in “substantially exclusive use” of the name. Yet
by 1990 or 2000, nonlegal factors may have reduced the
rate of sharing to a level at which the factor of substantially
exclusive use would weigh more heavily in favor of the
famous user. For example, at the time that the sportswear
manufacturer Nike, Inc. first used the brand name “Nike” in
1973, there was not just one other federal registration for
that name; rather, there were at least five.167 In addition to
167. The five registrations appear as results of a search performed on the
online Trademark Electronic Search System (“TESS”); a search session on this
system may be opened by following a hyperlink from the U.S. Patent and
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Nike Hydraulics, there were registrations for NIKE for
adhesive tape dispensers,168 for sandwiches,169 for perfume,170
and for a club.171 These uses, however, have all ceased,
presumably for reasons unrelated to trademark law, and
that has left “Nike, Inc.” in a better position to claim that it
is engaged in substantially exclusive use of the brand name
“Nike,” and thus to use trademark infringement and
dilution law to prevent renewed sharing of that name.
CONCLUSION
Although the sharing of brand names has been a
feature of commercial life since time immemorial, and has
long been recognized and accommodated by trademark law,
scholars have paid little direct attention to brandname
sharing as a phenomenon and have never traced changing
rates of brandname sharing. This Article has attempted to
provide an introduction to the study of brandname sharing,
and to present the results of an initial empirical study of the
sharing of 131 brand names in three cities over a seventy
year period. A major finding is the dramatic decline in
sharing rates of these 131 names between 1960 and 2010.
This Article has considered several potential nonlegal
causes of that decline, but also suggests that increased
trademark infringement protection, and newly introduced
trademark dilution protection, may have been responsible
for a substantial portion of that decline. Further empirical
work will help us to understand more about a phenomenon
that has been a common feature of consumer experience,
but now seems to be on the wane.

Trademark Office’s trademarks home page, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/
index.jsp. TESS, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tess2.uspto.gov/
bin/gate.exe?f=tess&state=4006:58if9m.1.1 (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). There
may have been more than five registrations, because the database that is
accessed through that system does not contain records of all of the registrations
that were cancelled before the 1990s.
168. See NIKE, Registration No. 622,166 (cancelled).
169. See NIKE, Registration No. 771,978 (expired).
170. See NIKE, Registration No. 775,529 (cancelled).
171. See THE NIKE CLUB, Registration No. 862,551 (expired).

